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Psychoanalysis and the Concept of a Rule

An Essay in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis

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Introduction

Since its earliest beginnings psychoanalysis has been a subject for intense discussion. This discussion partly concerned practical matters: psychoanalytic treatment seemed to be lengthy and expensive. Some have been critical of various psychoanalytic concepts, for example those concerning sexuality.

Increasingly, however, psychoanalysis has also become the subject of philosophical discussion. Developments within psychoanalysis itself have contributed to this because new ways have been forged which have clear links with philosophical movements. The French psychoanalyst Lacan, for instance, was concerned with philosophical structuralism and the American psychoanalyst R. Schafer, made the links with Anglo-Saxon action philosophy. Within philosophical circles, increasing interest has emerged for the philosophical problems which are inherent in the psychoanalytic endeavour. The work of the French philosopher Ricoeur, 'Freud and Philosophy' (1970) represents an hermeneutic approach to these problems. In contrast to this Grünbaum's intelligent work 'The Foundations of Psychoanalysis. A Philosophical Critique' (1984), represents an empiristic view. What presently emerges from psychoanalysis and from philosophy is a philosophy of psychoanalysis, or in loose terms, a discussion between philosophy and psychoanalysis.

This book, which attempts to examine some of the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, intends to make a contribution to this discussion. Fundamental concepts form the basis whereupon a particular method or theoretical framework is built. Every science which reflects upon its meaning and its possibilities does so within the framework of fundamental concepts. The physicist, for example, recognizes the problem of causality at this level. One can also ask if the theoretical approach in psychoanalysis is compatible with the empiristic framework of the natural sciences, or with the more hermeneutic framework emanating from the humanities.

Although, in this book, it is ultimately the hermeneutic vision which is defended, the point of departure is not the usual one. We will not review and criticise theoreticians of psychoanalysis and their approaches; our point of departure will be a description of psychoanalytic practice for the purpose of a philosophical investigation. Psychoanalysis indeed holds an exceptional position with respect to other sciences since it is based on treatment in practice. In

choosing this practical situation as a point of departure for philosophical investigation, this exceptional position is honoured.

Without acknowledging this special position of psychoanalysis, every discussion on a theoretical level would remain an abstract one. The specific contribution this book intends to make to the psychoanalytic-philosophical discussion, lays in its recognition of the importance of the psychoanalytic situation. In particular it emphasizes the significance of rules being applied in psychoanalysis - in psychoanalytic practice.

We contend that psychoanalytic practice or method is constituted by rules and that at the same time rules support and are indispensible for the practice of psychoanalysis. However, not all rules are equally important: rules in psychoanalytic practice are very special. We all are, for example, acquainted with the rule requiring that the patient say everything that comes to mind, and also with the one that determines position: the analysand does not on a chair sit opposite the psychoanalyst, but lies on a couch. It must also be explained why these rules - and not others - were introduced, and further to this we must define what is understood by a rule anyway: what is included in the definition and what isn't. In this way we may, at the same time, get a notion of what in psychoanalysis, in an hermeneutic sense, is understood by the terms of conscious and unconscious.

There is yet another reason why rules have an intrinsic significance. Psychoanalytic treatment involves repetition, albeit in different circumstances, of the process which every individual must go through in life: leaving his childhood behind and becoming independent and mature. Rules play an important part in this process and although each child may encounter different forms of rules within his family and environment, he will have to learn to live with them. Given this background, it is clear that rules should not only play a central part in psychoanalytic practice but also, we may assume, in the formation of the theory of psychoanalysis, as far as it describes this process of becoming independent. Rules not only have an important part to play in the practice and theory of psychoanalysis, but also, and remarkably so, in present-day philosophy. This is especially the case in Anglo-Saxon, so-called analytic philosophy to which the names of L. Wittgenstein and P. Winch are connected. The analytic school of philosophical thought occupies itself to a large extent intensively with the distinctive nature of human action and its involvement with rules. Here we shall try to apply insights provided by the philosophy of rule-following behaviour to the field encompassed by psychoanalytic theory and practice. At the same time, these applications form a transition to what is unmistakably a philosophical theme: what is to be considered the relationship between rules and action, between rules and interpretation, rules and freedom, rules and human existence as such? The notion that a transition, from the problems which rules bring about to the field of general philosophical problems, take place or could take place, does not imply that the preceding discussion isn't also

a philosophical one; it certainly is, at least in part. An investigation into rules and the meaning of rules, implies an examination of the foundations of psychoanalytic theory and practice and is therefore also of philosophical nature, for it serves to determine the scope and thus the domain of reality of psychoanalysis. A theory of foundations may be considered a form of philosophy, i.e. the philosophy of a certain domain of science or reality, similar to the philosophy of natural sciences (philosophy of nature), the philosophy of linguistics (philosophy of language), the philosophy of the science of history (philosophy of history).

Ever since it came into being psychoanalysis has lent a receptive ear to the problems of philosophy, a characteristic which is likely to have something to do with Freud's inclination to speculation. This receptiveness has led to what, since Freud, has been known in psychoanalysis as metapsychology. Here we find, firstly, a theory of foundations, next a theory on the so-called psychic apparatus, and thirdly, speculative notions on man's place in the universe. Any future philosophy of psychoanalysis which - as a theory of foundations - may be considered a legitimate heir to traditional metapsychology, will always remain greatly indebted to Freud's pioneering insights and formulations.

Yet we must be alert to further developments in psychoanalysis, for example, to developments within metapsychology itself such as egopsychology and theories like the ones that have been formulated by J. Lacan, A. Lorenzer and R. Schafer, but also to more clinically oriented authors in as far as they have dealt with the process of individuation in the infant, such as D.W. Winnicot, M. Mahler and H. Kohut.

In the next pages, the reader will undoubtedly be able to detect the influence of some of these authors - one, for instance, of Lacan where he stresses the meaning of culture and the value of language within a culture for the process of individuation. Above all, the reader will discover the unequivocal influence of Anglo-Saxon philosophy of rule-following behaviour. However, this influence by no means does away with the fact that we are making an attempt in developing our own contributions to a philosophy of psychoanalysis and, in particular, contributions to an hermeneutic approach in psychoanalysis.

Obviously its point of departure must be the psychoanalytic method, or, more precisely, its concretisation in the psychoanalytic situation. Part I of the book involves a description of this situation and reflects on its significance. Chapter 1 provides a first approach while giving an outline of two rules: the rule of free association by the client or person undergoing analysis, and the rule which determines the analyst's task. Since speaking is so central to psychoanalysis, rhetoric is consequently a matter for investigation. In chapter 2 four functioning rules and their background are outlined, namely the two previous rules and those concerning time and space. Also the concept of a rule as such and its implications are discussed. In the third chapter variation allowed by these rules is examined, whereby variation is not seen as changes in rules

to this, Chapter 4 deals with the question - which, by reason of its controversial nature, requires separate treatment - of whether there is actually a fifth rule, one concerning the matter of financing. Abstract distinctions in this regard are made concrete.

Part II of this book takes a look at problems of a more specifically philosophical nature; it contains chapters on the themes of action, interpretation, freedom and man as a speaking subject. The final position which the anthropological aspect has here, should make clear that anthropology also holds a key position in the sense that a theory of the foundations of psychoanalysis as the philosophy of psychoanalysis, ultimately finds its place within philosophical anthropology.

Although Parts I and II approach the matter from respectively different angles, they both deal with the problem of rules. Consequently, it has been difficult to avoid repetition, although we have tried to let the context determine the extent of our argumentation.

To whom is this book addressed? In the first place to psychoanalysts and to all those who wish to orientate their psychotherapeutic activities towards the psychoanalytic method of work and thougth. Secondly, we have specifically considered those whose field of activity lies outside psychoanalytic or psychotherapeutic practice but who, nevertheless - be they philosophers or social scientists - are interested in how psychoanalytic method can be justified in a philosophical sense.

Part I

The Psychoanalytic Situation

1 Rhetoric in the psychoanalytic situation

The basis of psychoanalytic practice is very simple. This simplicity suggests that the application is also simple. This is an error which is fostered by the uncomplicated nature of the analytic premise, in which the client meets the psychoanalyst because of problems he has experienced and commits himself to the rule that he will say everything that comes to mind, irrespective of whether this is difficult or anyway disturbing for him to do so. The client, who now becomes an analysand, will in fact without doubt experience considerable difficulty conforming himself to this rule, especially at the outset. Far from being an impediment to treatment this may even be beneficial because, while experiencing difficulty in talking about particular aspects of himself, the analysand becomes aware of an inner inhibition which may be indicative of underlying problems. Likewise, if the analysand does not talk about something which he might talk about, this occurs within the context of this rule which is so crucial to the situation that it has, since Freud, been called the basic or fundamental rule of psychoanalysis.

The analyst, for his part, adheres to the rule of listening with neutrality. By resisting all temptation to judge or criticize, he is, on the basis of what can be called a poised or suspended attention, capable of pointing out meaningful elements which were concealed, shifting emphases and posing questions with respect to things taken for granted. In his response to the analysand's story or narrative, he will interpret this narrative in such a way that it expresses something which was originally hidden. The analyst stops at this juncture, he does not do anything. The analysand also refrains from acting; he does not do what he says, but says what he would like to do. In the words of Freud: "Analytic treatment should be carried through, as far as is possible, under privation - in a state of abstinence."[1] Because both partners, only speak and listen, the analytic situation is by nature, one of dialogue; one of statement and response.

However, closer examination shows that the situation is paradoxical: the action which is effectively banished by the injunction to only speak and not to act, is nevertheless present in speech itself. One who speaks but does not act, is nevertheless doing something. He is, for instance, trying to impress the other or possibly even to snub him, he may be trying to gain approval for his own story or to comply with the expectations of the other. The speaker is engaged

in numerous actions. To what purpose? What the speaker is directly or indirectly trying to do is often not clear to the speaker himself and may be less clear to him than it is to another. The actions and intended transactions often appear to be minimal and they easily escape attention, but they are no less important for that. The paradox of the analytic situation which allows only speech and no action, is precisely what makes it possible to examine carefully and scrupulously what the subject is doing while speaking.

Of course, only in the actual analytic situation is one able to examine what a particular individual does while speaking and in this regard little can be said in general terms. But, by and large, something can be said about what an individual or analysand can or could do while speaking. Furthermore, something can also be said about what the analyst, in his turn and in his responses, can or could do. So we shall now attempt to show in principle what analysand and analyst, each in their own way, can do while speaking. Finally, to move away from the general nature of the exposition, clarification will be provided using the dream as an example.

The statement in practice: four aspects

In investigating the relationship between speech and action, it is useful to be guided by that branch of philosophy which has made a special study of this subject. I mean that part of the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of action with which the names of J.L. Austin and J.R. Searle are associated. They, in particular, considered speech as action. The following distinctions have been adopted, in slightly modified form, from them.

Anyone who talks, and thus also an analysand, talks about something or someone. He names things or people and he qualifies them. By naming them he refers to them and by qualifying them he gives them their meaning. To avoid discussion of the relationship between them, we can combine these two components and say that the speaker describes: he performs an act of description. Accordingly, what he says contains a *described content* (or proposition).

It is, however, possible that the speaker or analysand does not refer to an actual situation, but to an imaginary one. The content is thus a fantasied one and the narrative may then be referred to as fictitious or fictional, a tale, as in a novel or a poem. It could also be seen as a flight of fancy, or a daydream. In this way the speaker not only reveals content but he also reveals an attitude. In fact, speaker and thus also analysand, can never state content only and nothing more.[2] It is only possible for the speaker to describe content by simultaneously assuming an attitude with regard to that content (the so-called propositional attitude). The speaker can assume a number of attitudes: he can assert content (to be true or untrue), he can ask, demand, approve, order, promise, etc. In a concrete situation he orders or asserts. He actually does something. His attitude

(of ordering or asserting) is realized in a speech act (order or assertion). We speak here of a *speech act*, because the activity of description can take place only by way of such a specific act within which an attitude is realized.

What we see is an essential connection - and this is of fundamental importance - between the attitude with respect to content and the attitude towards the other. A request becomes a request only when it can be recognized as an attempt to have the other person do something. This aspect is not absent even in an assertion. If I say that a certain state of affairs exists, then I am also indicating to the other that I vouch for this. There is always an orientation towards the listener.

We have seen an orientation towards content and towards the other. The speaker (and thus also the analysand) can have an *effect* on the other. He draws a reaction. This effect can be intrinsically connected to the speech act concerned. I convince somebody only if he finally becomes convinced. I inform somebody only when he finally accepts the information and shows this. The effect can also be connected to the prior speech act in a non-intrinsic or extrinsic manner.[3] We then speak of a side effect or of an adverse effect, which occurs without it having been intended. The listener may be angry or sad as a response to a particular assertion, without the speaker having had this intention.

Apart from description, attitude, and the exercising of an intended or unintended effect, a fourth aspect can be recognised: *form or style*. The speaker presents what he says in a particular form. The form contains different levels. He will by preference follow particular grammatical rules and not others. He also draws from a vocabulary, he speaks bluntly or subtly and he uses figures of speech and shapes his story. He also chooses a particular genre, he may express himself mainly in a lyrical or in an epic form. And since every story consists of elements which follow each other in time, the story always contains a structure of time. This temporal structure, in which the shaping activity of the storyteller culminates, is the most formal aspect of the narrative.[4]

The technique of the response

Now that we have seen what the analysand can do as speaker, the task of the analyst must be further defined. The four aspects outlined provide a guideline, and by using it, the task of the analyst, sketched above as mainly an interpretive one, can be specified.

The analyst listens in a distinctive way. How, precisely, does he listen? First of all he listens to the descriptions and examines the given *content*. He is aware that describing things always means to select: to mention certain things is at the same time not to mention others. What is mentioned seems to have been presented always in a particular manner. The absence of certain references and qualifications becomes obvious. For instance, certain people are consistently

missing in the life story, or they appear with monotonous qualities. From a particular perspective, all kinds of content will appear to be missing. The analyst will gain certain impressions with regard to the missing pieces of the story and he may inform the analysand of these. The gaps apparent in the text are filled; the content becomes enriched.

The analyst should constantly take into consideration the attitude which is adopted toward the presented and missing content, and examine the way in which these attitudes ar brought forward in the speech acts. He looks for the factors which may indicate how a particular expression must be interpreted: these are the indications of the *speech act*. They may be explicit ("I assert", "I ask") or implicit (intonation, context). But just as much attention should be paid to those details which may confound interpretation, the contra-indications, and most particularly, the analysand's mystifications and concealed attitudes. The analyst can for instance establish that the analysand's account of something lacks an interrogative dimension. Thus, a particular statement may be interpreted as a veiled question, a promise as a demand, a congratulatory wish as a furtive reproach. It is thus of great importance - it is one of the peculiarities of verbal communication - that one and the same sentence can represent totally different attitudes, so that a speaker may consequently present different positions simultaneously in one utterance; may perform different speech acts. An observation (that it is late) can for instance function as objection (to someone who thinks it is actually early), or as a suggestion or even a request to be entitled to leave (to somebody who has a say in the matter) or as a warning (to someone in need of it).[5] Analytic attention is pre-eminently directed towards this stratification, and towards what, by way of it, must remain concealed.

If one wishes to find out which speech acts are used, it is useful to observe the *effects* on the listener. The analyst pays attention to the effects he observes in himself. He is in fact, his own instrument. We have seen that the effects can be connected with the speech acts either intrinsically or non-intrinsically: they may be intended or may occur incidentally. A statement is convincing only if the other person becomes convinced. In this case the relationship between statement and intended effect is intrinsic, and if the effect in question is not achieved, the conclusion must be that no such speech act (of convincing) took place. By contrast, there is no intrinsic connection between the establishment of a fact and a reaction of fright. However, a good guiding principle here is that an apparently unintentional, incidental effect was intended by the speaker. If the listener feels slightly threatened - however minimally - by a particular statement, then he will not accept it as a mere statement, but will more likely consider it a warning or threat. He will thus redefine the speech act. What, with respect to a particular speech act is a side-effect, is an intended effect with respect to another speech act. This notion stems from the principle - which of course can only be applied with the greatest consideration and caution - that

what is effected in the listener was also intended by the speaker, although conscious intention need not necessarily be, or even will be involved.

The analyst, or the speaker's 'other', is continually looking for what is concealed: missing content, veiled attitudes, effects whose intention is denied. These stem from the unconscious of the speaker and he will resist them to become manifest. The speaker narrates. But at the same time his narrative in the way in which it is told, gives shape to another story which is not meant to see the light of day. In this perspective, a study of form or shape is important, but this is undertaken not as a goal in itself but for the sake of its function. The main question is still what purpose this form serves. Recounting an epic story may conceal a lack of affective connotation and interrogative form, conferring the speaker's self-contentment. The shrouded message of the form is thus: "do not touch me". In the same way the temporal structure of a rhapsodic statement can obstruct simple and quick understanding; on the other hand, concentration on a central point of a history may obscure earlier history. Often a story is 'chanted' in verbatim or almost verbatim repetitions. These are the guiding motifs of the story, which give the story structure and provide the listener with clues. The analytic listener will ask himself which variations in the repetition have been lost: he will interpret the guiding motifs as persuading motifs.

The analyst examines the forces which are active in the narrative, and the corresponding acts and intentions of the narrator. Firstly he clarifies content. Next, he examines the speech acts performed. However, he does not stop at that juncture but continues to focus on side-activities, thereby extending the speech analysis. He then examines, interactionally, the intended effects, but he does not limit himself to the naivety of common sense: in a seemingly unintended effect he looks for unconscious intention. This manifests itself in aspect of form. His examination culminates in stylistics, but even goes beyond this. He examines style, but he goes on to detect in it partially successful and partially unsuccessful attempts at concealment. Suppressed content manifests itself in form, tricks appear and the game which is being played is exposed. He sees in the attempt to tell the story well, the ambition to convince the other rhetorically of both completeness and validity of the story. The analyst ultimately weighs the convincing force of the narrative, and his analysis is concerned with concealed meanings, with speech acts performed and with stylistic form, but above all with hidden rhetoric structures.[6]

An illustration by way of the dream

Even someone who speaks well makes mistakes. In a slip of the tongue something else surfaces. Psychoanalysis has always paid considerable attention to errors in speech and writing. A slip of the tongue indirectly reveals repressed

material. There was a lapse in vigilance. The same revelation occurs in dreams, where censorship is apparently less stringent than in daily life.

Freud compared the dream with a rebus which originally appears to be meaningless but which acquires meaning when every image is replaced with a letter, group of letters, or words: "The words which are put together in this way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty and significance."[7] Since in his analysis, the dreamer, in accordance with the fundamental rule, in the different elements of the dream, presents us with the material which comes to mind, analysand and analyst together can recover the underlying thoughts, the so-called dream-thoughts. In this way one progresses from manifest to latent dream content.

Of course, the dreamer has a particular attitude to this content. It is possible that he cannot, or will not, acknowledge that the particular state of affairs about which he dreamed, really is past. The dream is thus a fulfilment of a wish which has not been relinquished. In his dream he brings the desired state of affairs to a realization.

Apart from this, the dream can also contain an allusion to the person to whom the dream is being told: the analyst. This is often the case. The dreamer desires to bring about particular effects with regard to the other. He may for instance attempt to please the analyst, particularly if he is aware that his dreams are being appreciated. He attempts to seduce the other into playing a particular role.

But although censorship is less stringent, it remains active: the latent dream-thoughts manifest themselves in the dream content, but in a masked form. The effort the dreamer expends in order to confirm to the censorship is reflected here: this is the dream-work. The dream-work rewrites the latent dream-thoughts into manifest content. Firstly, the dream-thoughts must find a representation: text is converted into images.[8] This is the basis of dreaming as such. There are also two other mechanisms involved. The first is displacement. In the manifest content the emphases are different, they are displaced. That which is alluded to only obliquely in the manifest dream, what is marginal, or has even almost disappeared, is central in the latent content. The second mechanism is condensation. Here, different elements of the dream-thoughts are represented by one element of the manifest content. They have been condensed into this content, and this content has taken the place of a host of dream-thoughts. Persons dreamt about are often a collage of different people. Thus a distortion arises through which the original content is no longer recognizable: the message can avoid censorship.

In this way the analyst examines the form of the dream, and the distortion. In it, condensation and displacement can be equated with figures of speech. Displacement is then a metonym and condensation, a metaphor.[9] In a condensation there is a substitution of terms, and in displacement we observe a rearrangement or a curtailment. The concern here is not with the adequacy of

the parallel but with the meaning of the parallel, through which the dream-work may be seen as a form-giving, stylistic effort.

The goal of dream stylistics is to unveil as well as to obscure by way of which the dreamer both reassures and entices himself and the other. Thus in the last instance, dream-work has a rhetorical character. The analytic interpretation is based on a continual readiness for these distracting and persuasive effects. And in this sometimes strenous interpretive work, the dream-work is counteracted.

The dream and the unconscious

In interpretive work, the distortion which results from the dream-work is made undone and the underlying dream-thoughts which by being distorted were able to pass censorship, are recovered. The original, underlying or latent dream-thoughts have themselves remained undistorted and are just as well-formed as conscious thoughts.

This fact confronts us with the question of the possible origin of the distortion which elsewhere proves to be of such good service in avoiding censorship. In answer to this question, the thesis may be brought forward - and psychoanalysis does this - that beneath the latent dream-thoughts there is a level or sphere from which the capacity for distortion originates. This level or sphere on which dream-work rests and where condensation and displacement have their origins, is called the unconscious. The unconscious does not reveal itself directly, but only in an indirect manner, and most particularly in dreams, in slips of the tongue and parapraxes, where the same mechanisms of condensation and displacement may be demonstrated. In more general terms, it reveals itself in everything the subject says or does in as far as - in the way outlined in this chapter - distortion is also present with respect to people or situations, attitudes or intentions, consequences and results.

The following chapter indicates how this underlying, unconscious sphere itself should be viewed, and how other rules pertinent to the psychoanalytic situation contribute to allowing this sphere with its inherent distortions, to manifest itself.

Notes

1. Freud, 1918, p. 162.
2. Austin, 1970c, p. 234.
3. In accordance with this, a distinction can also be made in general, with regard to actions, between a consequence which is external or extrinsic to the action, and a result which is internal or intrinsic to the action. (von Wright, 1963).
4. The distinctions given here are borrowed from Searle (1974) who speaks of propositional, illocutionary, perlocutionary and utterance acts (p. 22-25). He also emphasizes the dependency of the propositional act. Cf. also Alston, 1964, p. 32-41.
5. Searle, 1974, p. 70.

6. The relationship between the rhetorical aspects of psychoanalysis and classical rhetoric has been examined by Van der Zwaal, 1987.
7. Freud, 1900, p. 278.
8. Freud, 1916/7, XV, p. 121.
9. Lacan, 1977, p. 159-161; Jacobson, 1963, p. 43-68; Sharpe, 1978, p. 20-25; States, 1988.

2 Rules in the psychoanalytic situation

In the previous chapter a picture of the psychoanalytic situation was drawn as a situation in which rules apply. The first, and because of its fundamental importance, basic rule, implies that the client or analysand agrees to say everything which comes to mind. However, treatment never occurs in a vacuum but is carried out within a framework of space and time. A second rule thus pertains to the spatial environment, in which the analysand lies on a couch and the analyst sits, out of sight, behind him. The third rule concerns time: whereas the duration of the total treatment is not predetermined, that of individual sessions is; it is constant and the frequency of sessions is high, in principle it is daily. A fourth and final rule - already mentioned in the previous chapter - defines the task of the psychoanalyst, who is to maintain neutrality and who refrains from evaluation or criticism in order to be able to interpret the material presented by the client without prejudgement.

These rules have not been chosen randomly, but they are the result of lengthy deliberation. Rules in general, and these rules too, evolve from a background which gives them their meaning. The basic rule thus has its roots in views about language and its function. The rule regarding frequency and duration refers to the aspect of time, and in its formulation is an answer to the question whether analysis requires much or little time and whether it is important that its conclusion is determined in advance or not. Similarly, the rule concerning the recumbent position of the analysand says something about the 'space' factor and the meaning of invisibility within it. Thus, it is apparent that the recommended rules, although they may at first seem to have limited practical value or may even seem trivial, have far-reaching significance. The recommended rules are thus not accidental but fundamental. The nature of the rules is such, that without the basic rule and the corresponding interpretive attitude of the psychoanalyst, and without the characteristic space and time requirements, psychoanalysis as such is not possible. Phrased in a different way: these rules constitute, or are the vehicle for, the analytic situation and they distinguish psychoanalysis from other modes of treatment which are based on different constitutive rules.[1]

Before we can determine why precisely these rules and not others have been chosen as constitutive rules for the practice of psychoanalysis, it is necessary

that we acquire more insight into content and purport of the notion 'rule' itself. It may then become apparent that the notion 'rule' in its general sense, has in fact fundamental significance for psychoanalytic theory and practice. Finally, with this insight, we can come back to the initial question, and investigate why these four rules in particular, have been chosen as fundamental to the psychoanalytic situation.

Rules: three characteristics

What actually is a rule?[2] First of all a rule can be seen as something lending expression to regularity in the same way that a relationship exists between the ebb and flow of the tides. Such a relationship is, however, based on natural and causal connections, whereas rules belong to the sphere of human activities and can be seen, in an hermeneutic way, as entities through which or by which people are guided. To the extent that people's activities are guided by rules, these may be described as rule-guided. Of course, not all rules are of equal importance at all times and in every situation, but there are rules which are fundamental to particular situations. One may think, for example, of general manners or of game rules.

In certain forms of manners or in a particular game, rules operate which are fundamental to the situation or game and in fact are 'constitutive', such as the rules of chess with regard to the game of chess and the rules of football with regard to football.[3] The fundamental or constitutive rules not only allow various rule-guided activities to take place, but they also distinguish them from each other, so that on the basis of the differences in the rules in question, football, for example, differs as much from handball as it does from rugby. Of course, discussion on the meaning and usefulness of not only the additional, but even the fundamental rules, is always possible because rules have never been, nor will ever be, a natural and causal phenomenon such as the tide's ebb and flow, but have been chosen above others in a particular way and for certain reasons. Even though in practice there is little or only partial discussion about an individual rule, and many rules apply implicitly, the possibility of choosing or rejecting rules always presumes the possibility of reflection and discussion with others.

This possibility for discussion with others - and this is a second characteristic or correlation - points to the impossibility of adhering to a rule in total spiritual isolation, without anybody else knowing anything about it. In such a situation, I would have no criterion for determining whether I only think I am following a rule or whether I am actually doing so. I could imagine that I have actually done so. In order to break through this illusion, I need a check, a reaction from another is necessary, another person who by his reaction appears to understand me and to be following the same rule. Adhering to a rule is thus always a

public and not a private matter.[4] In this regard, it is also true that in a game there is always agreement over the rules in question, even if this agreement has not necessarily been made explicitly and remains implicit, manifesting itself within the rule-guided domain. Moreover, an agreement involving two parties cannot be imposed or forced, but is only valid as an agreement if and to the extent to which both partners have committed themselves. Consequently, rules are not commands, because a command emanates from a person or an organization who commands on the basis of inequality of power, and possibly applies sanctions for disobedience, whereas a rule has validity by virtue of its acceptance by the person in question.[5]

Rules function neither solely as a guideline and nor do they merely bring about a public or social domain, but they also - and this brings us to a third and final point - enable separation and distinction. Rules actually define the conditions which must be fulfilled in order for an activity, for instance a greeting or warning, to be counted as a specific activity. In a similar way, one event is separated from other events and is named. In other words, the presence of a rule gives rise to differentiation and symbolization, and it thereby implements a symbolic domain of discrete entities. The separating and differentiating function however even goes beyond this, because by naming, a rule not only enables distinctions between events (or objects) to be made, but also between named objects and naming subjects. Indeed, a rule refers to a subject who is adhering to this rule, and to an object which falls under the rule, so that rules at the same time differentiate between a symbolizing subject and a symbolized object.

The unconscious

The rule-determined, symbolic and social domain which is brought about by rules is extremely far-reaching. Obviously public speech and action fall into this domain, but seemingly non-external mental functions, such as thinking and feeling, also belong to it. The reason for this lies in the fact that feelings and thoughts merely appear to be of an internal nature, because firstly they are always related to something which is to be found in the external world, and secondly, they are by their nature always connected to an expression or to behaviour, which are also public.[6] Finally, feelings and thoughts, in accordance with the last above-mentioned characteristic, are differentiated from each other and nameable.

Are there then, non-public feelings or thoughts? If this is so, then by definition they are not directed towards something in the external world and are not related to expressions. Consequently, they are also not differentiated or nameable, and are non-identifiable by either the subject himself or by someone else. Using Freud's terminology, we call such non-public feelings or thoughts

unconscious or unknowable.[7] This notion leads to a non-dynamic, hermeneutic conception of the unconscious. If we acknowledge the possibility for such feelings and thoughts to arise, then the sphere in which they exist is characterized by an absence of public rules which would relate them either directly or by means of expressions, to the external world. In other words, the terms within the sphere of the unconscious do not point in a referring sense to something outside this sphere, but only to each other in a differential sense. For example, unconscious hatred refers differentially to its direct opposite, unconscious love, but neither of them, if, and to the extent that they are unconscious, are related to an object of hate or love in the external world nor are they coupled with expressions. Due to the closed nature of the sphere of the unconscious, its component parts are related only to each other, and they easily lend themselves to either being connected to each other or to being dissociated. Thus, condensations and displacements are recognized as being characteristic for the way in which the unconscious functions, and this mode of functioning, as it was described by Freud, was named primary process by him. By contrast, using this terminology, the public domain of symbolization which is unlocked by rules, can be called secondary process because condensations and displacements do not play a dominant role there; indeed the aim of the secondary process is to determine which characteristics of an object distinguish it from the characteristics of other objects. In the same way that the public domain of rules is differentiation-orientated, the unconscious as the primary process tends towards immediacy and non-separateness, although this tendency does not exclude, or rather presupposes, difference between the elements.

The theoretical importance of rules for psychoanalysis

What was mentioned previously has both theoretical and practical importance for psychoanalysis. The theoretical importance lies in the fact that psychoanalytic theory is concerned in particular with the transition from the primary mode of functioning to participation in a public and symbolic domain. To be more precise, analytical theory is concerned with the transition from the primary way of functioning of the infant to the secondary mode of functioning of an adult to be. This transition is certainly a slow process. Gradually the child is introduced into the framework of rules of language and to the opinions and feelings which are present in the culture and family in which the child is growing up. But although this happens step by step, it still implies a break with the situation which existed prior to acceptance of a particular set of rules. In general terms, the primary phase is one of supposed unity of mother and child in which the child 'thinks' that it is one with the mother and can be everything to her, and in which separation and distinction are still beyond the horizon. But the introduction and acceptance of a pattern of rules leads to separation and distinction.

The child learns to shake its head to indicate 'no', it learns to differentiate sounds and their meanings, it notices that there is a difference between people, and it learns that, all the necessary and far-reaching intimacy between mother and child not withstanding, differences still remain; differences between mother and child, parents and children, between mothers and fathers, boys and girls.

So with the acceptance of a basic set of rules, a public and symbolic domain in which certain rules and differences apply, comes into being. Feelings and thoughts which in the previous primary phase of supposed unity were undirected, become directed towards the external world, which then becomes a subjective world for the child. But this public and symbolic domain is above all a social domain in which all participants more or less adhere to the pertaining rules which differentiate parents from children, fathers from mothers and men from women.

The practical meaning of rules

The practical meaning of the relationships presented is that in the course of an analysis as a form of treatment, the transition from an early, primary mode of functioning to a secondary mode, is repeated. Further, if one says that the goal of treatment is to render the unconscious conscious, one is expressing the same thing in different words, because the unconscious as the primary sphere is to be seen as a derivative or remnant of the primary mode of functioning from the early child-mother relationship, and the conscious in its turn, may be regarded as the secondary mode of functioning which occurs in a public and symbolic domain.

The transition from unconscious to conscious, i.e. from a primary to a secondary mode of functioning, in psychoanalytic treatment is effected by involving the primary sphere as much as possible with the external reality. One can use the word 'projection' here, although this word is misleading. It does not mean a projection by a projecting subject, because in fact there is no such subject within the primary sphere. It is much more a projection in a geometrical sense, in the way that a flat surface can be projected onto a globe. In this way, the primary sphere, which cannot be known directly, because after all it is not a world containing distinguishable and recognizable objects, makes itself known only in an indirect way.

The projection of the primary, pre-worldly sphere onto external reality, produces what can be called an imaginary world. This gives the appearance of worldliness or in other words of rule-guidedness, but it does not really possess the features of rule-guidedness because it remains rooted in the primary, pre-worldly sphere. In the imaginary world, the 'other', for instance, is not encountered in its otherness, but he is clothed with elements from the pre-wordly or primary sphere. On the other hand the imaginary world also has a

worldly character, which makes it obvious that it is also embedded in the shared, symbolic reality and in the shared, rule-guided reality. Thus the imaginary world does not only presuppose the existence of the primary sphere but also one of an area delineated by rules within which it can manifest itself. Using a spatial metaphor, one could say that the imaginary world is to be found between the primary and secondary spheres, and thus exercises an intermediary function.[8]

Four psychoanalytic rules

If we say that in psychoanalytic treatment the transition from a primary to a secondary mode of functioning is repeated, we should not forget that this re-enactment takes place in altered circumstances with respect to those of the original transition in the past early childhood. The altered circumstances are connected with the four psychoanalytic rules which shape the psychoanalytic situation. Within the treatment situation, by virtue of the nature of the pertaining rules, a specific form of the imaginary world comes into being in the phenomenon referred to as transference, in which the analytic rules function to maximize the involvement of the primary sphere in external reality. This will become clear when we once again review the four analytic rules.

The basic rule - that the analysand say all that comes to mind - actually allows an entry into the primary sphere where the process of association starts. An association in this form is only an association in the real sense of the word within the framework of free association, when the continuity of a narrative is disturbed by an interruption, encroachment or an unexpected association. The interruptive nature of associations suggests that this primary sphere is not concerned with the chronology of the stream of consciousness or with the logic of the narrative. The second rule regarding time - the fixed duration of each session on the one hand with the indetermined duration of the total treatment on the other - also fits in with the achronological or timeless nature of the primary sphere.[9] The turning towards the primary sphere is subsequently expressed by the turning away from external reality, which process - by way of the third rule - acquires a spatial form by the reality-averting, recumbent position of the analysand. The invisibility of the analyst facilitates the transformation of the real analyst into an imaginary figure to which the imaginary world can be attached. Thus, by way of the analytical rules referred to, a fragmented, imaginary world is condensed into a specific, imaginary world centred upon the analyst, who as an imaginary figure aquires elements deriving from the primary sphere. Around the person of the analyst an imaginary world crystallizes in which all the characteristics of distortion are present, and thus of neurosis which can rightly be called transference neurosis. However, although imagination and distortion of reality are dominant in transference neurosis, reality is

not absent in the psychoanalytic situation. Reality is introduced by the analyst, not as an imaginary or transference figure for the analysand, and even not as real person as such, but in his capacity as analyst, who speaks or maintains silence. If, within the terms of the fourth and final rule, he does say something, or even if he remains silent, either way he rearranges the material presented by the analysand.

In the same way that the psychoanalyst responds with interpretations or symbolizations, the basic rule of saying all that comes to mind, also induces the analysand to symbolize. As has been said, by way of his symbolization or associations, the primary sphere increasingly becomes part of a symbolic domain by way of its projection into an imaginary world or transference neurosis. Central to, and at the same time the vehicle for every analysis, is thus the specific form of imaginary world which the transference consists of. This is of such importance that it can be said to be the battleground on which the battle is won or lost.[10]

Again: rules

When, and to the extent that this is more or less successful, the passage from the primary sphere to participation in a public and symbolic field obtains its definite foundation. The analysand will increasingly be inclined to see his behaviour, which he has consistently viewed as an unalterable part of his nature, as in fact regulated by rules by which he is apparently led and which he as a person, is consequently responsible for. Apparently meaningless expressions, unreasonable behaviour and experiences which used to defy description, are interpreted and made meaningful. The symbolic and verbal domain is enlarged. This is progress.

At the same time however, something is lost: an illusion. The increasing acceptance of rules and differences goes hand in hand with progressive abandonment of the early situation of supposed unity between mother and child, in which the child - inevitably - believes that he can be everything to the mother and that the mother, for her part, can be everything to him. This illusion is as inevitable as is mother's participation in it. To renounce this illusion and to accept this apparent loss certainly is not a battle which can be won in one strike, but it involves a gradual shift of positions which has its approaching front lines and its abandoned trenches. This is because the beckoning music of an own existence and the motherland of the past both have their attractions and their intrinsic dangers.

It is precisely because of this background that it is so important in an analysis (where this advance is underway), that the question of rules and everything which it implies, be raised. This does not require a lengthy explanation in a special session beforehand or afterwards, but the therapeutic situation must

be constructed in such a way that the problem is confronted. In the course of his analysis the analysand will come to realize that the acceptance of rules implies no compulsion and that by coming the analysand follows his own interests and does not do this in order to please or trouble an imaginary other, even if in his transference neurosis or imaginary world he may think so, and even if the analyst because of his own possibly unresolved transference neurosis, also thinks that rules imply compulsion.

Both analysand and analyst are now able to accept that the rules in psychoanalysis, if understood correctly, do not represent compulsion but, nevertheless, that they may not suddenly be removed. For rules are not just supervening attributes of the psychoanalytic process which develops by itself anyway and which above all should not be disturbed, but they actually constitute the psychoanalytic domain and make interpretation of what happens within it, possible, whereas other rules, consequently, implement other fields to explore.

Precisely how other rules leads to other domains, and the extent to which this is done, is the subject of the following chapter.

Notes

1. The term 'constitutive' was chosen rather than the possible alternatives 'regulative' or 'institutional'. The disadvantage of the term 'regulative' is the Kantian connotation in the antithetical terms 'regulative- constitutive'. The principle of causality is constitutive for nature and allows of no exceptions. According to Kantian thought, nature can also be viewed as if designed for a purpose. Such an 'as if' view is called 'regulative'. Psychoanalytic rules lack such an 'as if' character and therefore the term 'regulative' is less suitable. Some exceptions however are allowed: the agreement that the analysand say what he thinks does not prevent him from opting to remain silent. Also, on the basis of the contrafactual validity of the rules in question, they could be called institutional. (De Boer, 1983, p. 104-117). The term 'constitutive' has been chosen to emphasize that these particular rules, even if they allow exceptions in some instances, do shape the psychoanalytic situation as such.
2. Wittgenstein, 1958; Winch, 1958; von Wright, 1963.
3. The rules referred to here are called constitutive or transcendental precisely because they allow for certain behaviour to take place: they provide the conditions for that behaviour. L. Wittgenstein clearly describes the constitutive, or in his words 'grammatical' function (1958, par. 251, 373, 401).
4. Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 244-266.
5. Wittgenstein writes (1965, p. 24): "A rule is neither a command - because there is no one who gives the command - nor is it an empirical statement of how the majority of people behave".
6. Kenny, 1963, p. 187-202; Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 256; Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 242.
7. Freud, 1913b, p. 187.
8. There is probably a similarity between what is here referred to as imaginary world and Winnicott's intermediate area, but there is also a difference. The similarity lies in the semi-symbolic function which occurs in both. A difference is that the imaginary world includes a regressive movement, while the intermediate area develops into the potential space of the culture and thus expresses a progressive tendency. (Winnicott, 1980b; Khan, 1974). There is also similarity and difference with regard to the imaginary order in the sense of Lacan. The imaginary order is also larger than the imaginary world and it contributes to culture by way of the image and it is therefore not concerned exclusively with

regressive phenomena, such as illusion. More generally, psychoanalysis would probably benefit if a study were made of traditional theories concerning imagination and illusion which have been formulated in western thought: for instance, Plato's doxa, Spinoza's knowledge of the first kind, Kant's transcendental illusion, and more recently, the critique of ideology.

9. In Lacan, the length of individual sessions changes; apparently the constitutive rule here is that the duration of sessions is not constant. The disadvantage of this is that - in spite of appearances to the contrary - the timeless nature of the primary sphere which Lacan also consistently refers to, is not honoured, for the constant length of the sessions makes the point that neither party may suddenly call a stop. That which best expresses the timelessness of the primary sphere in the total duration of treatment, has the opposite effect in individual session length. A second disadvantage of this flexibility, is that in this way the duration becomes an intervention factor and does not remain a factor of the setting. Furthermore, since only the analyst determines the moment of conclusion, a real dependency relationship is fostered. (Cf. Lacan, 1977, p. 44; Viderman, 1982, p. 306).

10. Freud, 1912, p. 108; Gill, 1982.

3 Variations of the psychoanalytic framework of rules

Since its hesitating start in the beginning of this century, psychoanalysis has found broad acceptance the world over. As a method of treatment it is used on some scale, and as a theory it has influenced numerous scholarly disciplines. It has also contributed to the development of forms of treatment which are orientated towards psychoanalysis but which also seem to diverge from it: the many forms of psychotherapy which at the present time even seem to be overshadowing psychoanalysis. One could question whether this is matter of repression in terms of loss of territory, or whether it does concern repression in the psychoanalytic sense of the word in which essential elements of the psychoanalytic process are being rejected. The latter possibility could imply that any conflict between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy would be settled with a compromise by way of what is called 'psychoanalytic psychotherapy' a description which would retain the term psychoanalytic but would not, by its use, guarantee content.[1] The use of this term has become so popular that we now encounter expressions such as: psychoanalytic individual psychotherapy, psychoanalytic group therapy, psychoanalytic couples- or marriage therapy, etc.[2] Are all these combinations permissible, or do some of the activities named in this way cross into territory which should preclude the use of the term 'psychoanalytic'? This question can perhaps best be framed in terms of the principles which govern the activities which are, or may be, called 'psychoanalytic'.

Method

Questions in the form of "What is...?" are, in themselves, not popular in contemporary philosophy because they can be interpreted as questioning the hypothetical existence, or the essence of something. Here this question is more acceptable, because psychoanalysis and other forms of psychotherapy are not encountered as natural phenomena but are contrived. An answer to the question "What actually is psychoanalytic activity?" is thus to be found in a description of how the activity requiring definition is conceived or comes about. Definition referred to here is a so-called constructive definition, an example of which is a pharmaceutical prescription which contains a series of instructions

which must be followed in order to fulfil the requirement in question.

We must therefore investigate the requirements or rules of those forms of psychotherapy which claim the term 'psychoanalytic'. The findings must then be tested against the rules which pertain to psychoanalysis. If sufficient harmony exists between the two sets of rules, the term may be considered valid; if there is considerable discrepancy, then the term 'psychoanalytic' should not be applied to the practice in question.

Choosing this method or procedure does of course mean rejection of other methods. An alternative viewpoint would be to assume that any activity which makes use of psychoanalytical insights or theoretical premises, can be called psychoanalytic. A first disadvantage of that approach is that one transfers the question from practice to theory, while psychoanalytic theory is based upon practice. Things are thus turned the other way around. Secondly, this way of identification yields an enormous range of possibilities, since psychoanalytic viewpoints can be applied to almost anything. In other words: the discriminating ability of that alternative is very small.

The procedure we suggest here produces, on the contrary, a limited range of possibilities and possesses moderate discriminating ability. In particular, it contributes to answering the question of what may be called psychoanalytic. It, in fact, investigates the minimal criteria which must be met if an activity is to be called psychoanalytic and it provides us with an understanding of a 'psychoanalytic minimum in a practical sense', which is broader than the one restricted by the rules of psychoanalysis in its narrow sense. We also acquire more insight into what psychoanalytic activity actually is, because by varying the rules, relief is added to the invariant border.[3]

We shall limit ourselves in the main, to the individual form of psychotherapy, because here where resemblance is most obvious, the question is most cogent. In this mode of treatment the patient or client does not lie on a couch but both client and psychotherapist are seated more or less opposite each other.

Rules in so-called individual psychoanalytic psychotherapy

The individual form of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, as is the case with psychoanalysis in the strict form of classical psychoanalysis, has four rules which relate to: the task of the client or patient, that of the psychotherapist, the arrangement of space, and fourth, of time. Most important here is the basic rule, which according to the authoritative R. Langs - author of a current standard text - is essentially: "The therapist's expectation that the patient will say everything that comes to his mind in his therapy sessions, without exception."[4] One could ask if this requirement is actually reasonable. The fundamental rule in psychoanalysis in its strict form, as outlined in Chapter 2, aims to provide access to the primary or unconscious sphere which then may manifest itself in transference

associations as an imaginary world or as a transference neurosis. A turning away from external reality is therefore appropriate, as is a passive attitude because of the spontaneous nature of the associations. Both of these factors are allowed expression by the recumbent position of the analysand. A sitting position, by contrast, forces the client's orientation towards external reality, while this more socially acceptable attitude is also somewhat more conducive to conversation. It would thus seem to be contradictory to construct a non-modified basic rule on the one hand, and to prefer a socially appropriate and reality-orientated attitude on the other. In this light it could be recommended that the basic rule be formulated differently for the face-to-face situation, taking the altered position into account. This rule could express the requirement that the patient say as much as possible of what comes to mind; the in this case impossible requirement that everything should be said, would then be abandoned. There is thus a basic rule which determines access to the primary sphere, but the functioning variant does take the second rule concerning the spatial environment into account.

The second rule does not only have an effect with regard to access to the primary sphere, but it is also concerned with the relationship of the partners. The face-to-face situation implies not only a certain penetration, a certain intrusion of external reality, but also introduces the factor of 'seeing', as well as the visibility of the face.[5] Seeing probably implies a greater degree of objectifying than does listening. One sees someone and listens to someone. J-P. Sartre particularly emphasized the objectifying character of visual perception in his well-known treatment of the gaze (le regard).[6] And where auditive perception is dispersed because of the linearity of the spoken word, visual perception occurs from a central and thus all-encompassing perspective.[7] The objectifying and all-encompassing character of seeing has the effect that - to some extent and at a certain level - the psychotherapist becomes an object for the client but also that the client becomes an object for the psychotherapist. Thus a mutual objectification takes place, or at least it can take place.[8]

A further aspect of this, is the situation that through seeing, access to the other is to a great extent immediate, while through listening, communication first has to be decoded before it can be understood and perhaps even then may require further interpretation. By contrast, through seeing, the other party appears to be directly accessible, an illusion which is further reinforced by the openness of the face. This in fact leads to narcissistic complications: the child sees in the mother's face her face but also its own, it sees the other and as a reflected Narcissus, itself.[9] The visibility of one's face in a vis-a-vis situation has the effect that both partners - symmetrically - are able to see each other objectively and also reflectingly. This situation forms an inhibition to the free-floating and interpretive attention of the one, but also the free association of the other. Since in this way access to the primary sphere is complicated, there is consequently less development of an imaginary world as a derivative of the primary

sphere, and thus also a lower level of transference neurosis. This situation likewise has the protective function of shielding both partners against the fragmenting and splitting effect of the analytic situation in its strict form.

Thirdly, with regard to the factor of time, the frequency of sessions in individual psychoanalytic psychotherapy is considerably less than that of classical analysis. Although analysis adopts in principle a daily frequency, in psychoanalytic psychotherapy a frequency of one or two sessions per week is usual. In psychoanalysis the total duration of treatment is left undetermined. There is an inconsistency in restricting the frequency on the one hand but not the total duration on the other, because the high frequency ('every day') and the indefinite duration ('always') as an analogy of the timelessness of the primary sphere, aim for a maximal access to this sphere. While maximal access is precisely what is not intended by the lower frequency of contacts and the face-to-face situation. In line with the variation of the basic rule, it would seem to be reasonable to vary the time-rule in such a way that an indication of the total duration is given without this being exactly established by means of a termination date or a fixed number of sessions.[10]

Fourthly and finally, the task of the analyst differs from that of the psychotherapist. The most important technique of the psychoanalyst is silence: he maintains silence or says little. He says little in a quantitative sense because he usually uses few words; he says little in a qualitative sense because he is reserved with respect to the matter in hand: the conflict. The temptation to which the psychoanalyst is exposed is to say too much: to say something too often or to go too far with regard to content. The first temptation is facilitated by a technique which is centred on the analysis of resistence[11]; the second temptation is to be found in the approach of Melanie Klein. However, neither temptation greatly disturbs the relatively non-intrusive and silent character of the psychoanalyst's basic attitude. By contrast, the psychotherapist will on the one hand generally be more talkative in the quantitative sense, but on the other hand will adopt a more reserved interpretive attitude. He is more talkative because this is appropriate to the social character of the situation, and he is more reserved with regard to interpretation for the following two reasons. Because the imaginary world or transference neurosis does not, at least generally, develop extensively, interpretation of the transference is less appropriate, although it is also of course, not to be excluded. Further, because the basic rule is not that of classical analysis, silence by definition has a different value and will also therefore not be as systematically dealt with, and certainly may not be too hastily interpreted as resistance or opposition to the fundamental rule. Interpretations with regard to content will also focus more quickly on a basic theme which follows to a lesser extent the diverging offshoots, and centres more on the core. In Freudian terms content analysis is more concerned with constructions regarding life history than with interpretations of transference, although of course these certainly have their place.[12] Consequently, psychoanaly-

tic theory has another and indeed a broader significance. The analyst will usually be inclined to somewhat forget this; the psychotherapist must be well aware of it because constructions are relatively important and they may be seen as giving concrete form to psychoanalytic theory in its application to the individual life history of the patient. Parallel to this, greater demands for inventiveness are made on the psychotherapist: because free association does not play as great a role, he must consequently construe and offer interpretations in spite of there being less material available. This is a further confirmation of the fact that the psychotherapist, in contrast to the psychoanalyst, fulfils a more active role in the therapeutic process.

Psychoanalytic psychotherapy?

Now the question can be put as to whether one can speak of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, when psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in the face-to-face form as described above, are placed side by side. Firstly, it is evident that in both cases, delineated rules pertain which function as an agreement between not more than two partners. It also appears that the four rules relate to four identical fields, but in pairs they also differ.

Although the basic rule of individual psychotherapy as it has been presented here, differs in some ways from that of psychoanalysis in its strict form, the two show considerable resemblance. Further, although the psychotherapist's task is rather different from the analyst's, great resemblance exists here also. The two rules of individual psychotherapy as outlined here, are clearly a variation of the corresponding rules of psychoanalysis in its strict form and not a modification.

This resemblance is absent however, in the matter of position. The sitting position cannot be viewed as a variation of the recumbent position. Therefore we are confronted here with a modification extending outside the psychoanalytic scheme.

The time-rule thus becomes crucial when the two schemes are weighed against each other. Should this also lead us *hors* the psychoanalytic scheme, it becomes difficult to go on talking of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. There are two facets to the time rule: the duration of the treatment and the frequency of the sessions. If one were to determine the total length of the treatment in advance, this would undeniable lead to a conflict with the rule of psychoanalysis in its strict form, which strongly emphasizes the unlimited duration of treatment. Similarly, a conflict would arise if one were to limit the frequency of sessions to once a week, whereas the psychoanalytic rule in fact presumes daily meetings (or in any case a high frequency). A frequency of one session per week is too much a restriction to be considered a variation of the high frequency of multiple sessions per week.

These formal considerations are also supplemented by an argument over

content. The high frequency and the undetermined total duration are intended to create a resemblance to the timeless nature of the primary sphere. If the duration is likewise restricted, and especially if it has been determined in advance, access to the primary sphere will be hampered and the resistance to this access will be difficult to work on. Thus, a high frequency does not preclude a focussing attitude on the part of the patient but neither does it necessitate one, while contact which only takes place at polite intervals, certainly does. Minimal concern for time and thus a positive resemblance to the timelessness of the primary sphere is necessary to allow a workable transference to manifest itself sufficiently. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy thus requires real multiple frequency and no limitation in the total duration, even though it may be desirable to have some limitation.

The foregoing can now be summarized, albeit extremely briefly, as follows. In psychotherapy as described here, the construction - in its duality - is identical to that in psychoanalysis in its strict form, and only one of its rules extends outside the psychoanalytic scheme. This allows the conclusion that the individual form of psychotherapy as described here may be called psychoanalytic.

If this is the case, the reach of what may be called psychoanalytic is extended. Acceptance of the described form of psychotherapy, leads to a broadening of the concept 'psychoanalytic'.

Does this broadening of the concept and the extension of the terrain go so far that one can speak of psychoanalytic group psychotherapy or psychoanalytic couples- or marriage therapy? In both cases the situation of visual contact shows clear resemblance to the face-to-face form of individual psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Although we have not spoken earlier about these forms of psychotherapy, some comments should be made in the light of the foregoing. In group psychotherapy, where a number of clients and one or two psychotherapists come together, the dyadic character of psychoanalysis upon which all four rules are based, is absent. Because of the relatively large number of clients involved at one time, free association in principle is of minor importance and the interpretive effort of the psychotherapist is not directed, or directed only to a limited degree, towards the developing transference to the psychotherapist, but instead focuses on the interactions between the group members. In view of our line of thinking developed here, it does not seem appropriate in this case to speak of a variation of the psychoanalytic framework. Lastly, a similar comment can be made with regard to couples- or marriage therapy where a married couple or partners enter into discussions together with one or two psychotherapists. Notwithstanding the rules which pertain here, the one-to-one therapeutic relationship is also absent, the role of free association is limited, and interpretation is for the most part concerned with interactions within the partnership, so that this form of therapy likewise extends outside the psychoanalytic frame of reference.

Finally

The above says nothing to the discredit of these other forms of psychotherapy, but it does imply that other forms - those discussed or those which closely resemble those discussed - are not derivative, but autonomous modes of treatment. Of course, this independent position does not exclude one being entitled to interpret symptoms arising within these modes using psychoanalytic viewpoints in the way that these viewpoints are applied in psychiatric diagnostic procedures or in interpretation in literature. However, the application of psychoanalytic viewpoints within such autonomous areas does not transform them into psychoanalytic modes or activities.

There can be no discussion here - because the relevant defense falls outside the scope of this chapter - of the notion that one keeps oneself from essential understanding in whatever area, but certainly in psychotherapy, psychiatry and even in the study of literature, if one closes one's eyes to insights which psychoanalysis has provided. What can be discussed however is a problem of borders defining. The presentation of the problem of borders has both theoretical and practical significance. The theoretical gain is that a clearer view, as to the essence of what is called psychoanalytic, is attained. The practical importance is that the separate identity of the various forms of psychotherapy is ensured. The psychoanalytic form itself has a variant, but the variation may not lead to the obscuring of essential distinctions which were constructed intentionally. In other words, differences which exist because of the functioning rules should not be invalidated.

Notes

1. Alexander, 1954; Gill, 1954; Rangell, 1981; Wallerstein, 1989.
2. Anzieu, 1975; Grotjahn, 1977.
3. Using a term derived from Greek we can characterize the method followed as one of an "eidetic variation", because through variation an essential or eidetic difference becomes clear. The eidetic variation is proven in phenomenology as intuiting of essences or categorical intuiting. In our situation the same problem is approached in terms of rules.
4. Langs, 1973, p. 169.
5. Freud, 1913a, p. 134.
6. Sartre, 1943, p. 298-352.
7. Foucault, 1963, p. 107-125.
8. Lacan, 1986, p.84.
9. Winnicott, 1980c.
10. Malan, 1963.
11. Greenson, 1967.
12. Freud, 1937.

4 The meaning of the money factor for the psychoanalytic situation

There is always discussion about the financing of psychotherapy. The discussion centres on practical matters such as the sources from which psychotherapy should be financed, whether budget financing offers or denies equal opportunity, and other related questions. Notably however, there is little interest in the consequences of this whole dimension for the psychotherapeutic process itself. What are the implications for the psychotherapeutic process if the expense involved is no longer borne by the client himself but by others? Are there advantages or disadvantages to this, or does the manner of payment make no difference? On the whole there has been very little discussion on these questions.[1] It sometimes appears that the existence and desirability of payment from social service monies or insurance companies is taken for granted, without questioning the bases and consequences of this attitude.

The situation is thus one in which money plays a role only as an external factor, making the psychotherapeutic process materially possible but having no further part in it. Money thus only plays a role in discussions with the State or the insurance companies, which are both mostly viewed as the wrong-doers because, it is argued, they never make enough resources available. As a consequence of this the financial aspect in psychotherapy is considered a negligible one.

It may be asked whether this is a correct perception. Further deliberation indicates an element of distortion which results in a failure to see the evidence that money does indeed play a role, if only for the fact that when client and psychotherapist agree to begin treatment, their agreement can be viewed in legal terms as an agreement for the lending of services.

An attempt will be made here to give an indication of the role which money can actually play within an individual psychotherapy. Attention will also be drawn to the possible consequences of negligence over the question of the money factor and of obscuring the fact that psychotherapy does cost money - an obscurance which certainly does not take place in the general discussion within society but which often does occur within an individual psychotherapy. Finally, a comment concerning the possible effects of methods of payment using social service funds will be made, and a recommendation to meet the objections raised will be proposed. But first we will investigate why the question of finan-

cing may be neglected within psychotherapy, and we shall have to give an indication of what consequently is to be understood by psychotherapy.

Background to the neglect of the money factor

A person can of course only decide for himself why he is, or is not, able to speak freely about money matters. However, it is not implausible that when a psychotherapist detects an inhibition in himself, this is due to embarrassment or guilt over the fact that he makes his money out of the suffering of others. If he is motivated to help and do good for others, and particularly if he sees psychotherapy as a form of assistance which alleviates need, the knowledge that he makes money from that need may give rise to feelings of embarrassment and remorse. But when in addition to this he must make his own living, and furthermore enjoys earning money, the basis is laid for a conflict which will manifest itself in the obscuring of questions of money.

The client may also benefit from this situation. In general, he does not want to feel that his helper is a vampire; he would rather see him as someone who has his best interests at heart and will possibly even make sacrifices in order to help him. This desire on the client's part can of course exist side by side with the knowledge that 'you don't get something for nothing', which conflicting notions when taken together, present a conflict that may lead to a veiled view of the money factor. When there is an unconscious but common interest in the 'game' by both psychotherapist and client, they look upon society as the third party. Although generalizations in this matter are no less precarious than generalizations about unconscious motivations, it can be claimed that the desire to make money, especially to make a lot of money, seems to have become a matter for embarrassment or concern and therefore might lead to both a guilty conscience and feelings of shame. That does not mean of course, that this desire has ceased to be, as may be illustrated by the exponential increase in number of the various interest-protecting organizations. The conflict finds a solution in a splitting process in which the psychotherapist involved spares himself in the contact with the client by using tariffs which have been formulated by others, and does not himself resolve financial conflicts with the client but delegates the issue to the organization responsible.

Thus the unconscious and also conscious desires of both psychotherapist and client, namely to respectively be or to have a good and generous mother, are met through such a splitting process, whereby the psychotherapist does not talk about the matter of money during therapy, but (whether through an organization or not) outside the therapeutic setting determinedly fights for what he sees as his due.

The psychoanalytic or psychotherapeutic situation

What actually is understood by psychotherapy? In the following paragraph, discussion will be limited to the forms of psychotherapy which may be called psychoanalytic: psychoanalysis in its strict form and psychotherapy which sufficiently conforms to this model (see Chapter 3). Consequently, the terms 'psychoanalysis' and 'psychotherapy' and also 'psychoanalyst' and 'psychotherapist' will be used interchangeably so that psychotherapist will read as 'psychoanalytic psychotherapist'.

There are three distinct levels in the psychoanalytic or psychotherapeutic situation. The first level is that of the rules or agreements which constitute the psychotherapy in question and distinguish it from other forms of psychotherapy.[2] In the psychoanalytic situation, the fundamental rule whether varied or not, that the client agrees to say all that comes to mind, applies. The client will in varying degrees clothe the psychotherapist or analyst with emotional expressions in which this 'all' plays a role. These are findings from earlier, and the earliest, spheres where there is little differentiation within the imaginative world and the one in which the child experiences himself and his parents as almighty. Qualities not belonging to the psychotherapist will be attributed to him. This is the second level, and it can be called the level of imagination. The aim of this construction is that the client, by working through his imagination, can free himself from his childish (not actual but imagined) dependencies, in the general expectation that if these fancied dependencies are removed, he will no longer be directed by them but will become more capable of self-determination. The third and final level is that of reality, the reality in which the psychotherapist or analyst is the one he is, neither as horrible nor as gentle as the client has imagined him to be, and a level in which the client is who he is, no longer an angry or anxious child. Therapist and client both are people who must eat and drink, may be happy or miserable, and who must in one way or another provide their own means of support.

How does money play a role in psychoanalysis or in psychotherapy?

If we take these three levels as a guideline, the first question which presents itself is whether or not money plays a constitutive role in terms of the agreement between patient and psychotherapist. In other words, is there, besides the four rules concerning the patient's task, the psychotherapist's task, the spatial environment and the time factor, a fifth rule relating to the financing of the therapy? This seems undoubtedly to be the case, although because of the above mentioned reasons, it is not always acknowledged. The psychoanalyst does give something away (time) and receives something in return (money) either from

the client or from a third party. If the psychoanalyst asks money for his time, it is appropriate to recognize this constitutive fact as such.

An additional reason for emphasizing this state of affairs, is that an agreement over money brings psychotherapy or psychoanalysis and society with its institutions together. In determining the amount of the fee or the part of it which the client is eventually required to pay, account should be taken of his ability to pay but also of what, in accordance with the accepted view of the training and the experience of the psychotherapist or the psychoanalyst, is seen as fair.[3] The linking of psychotherapy and society through payment for therapy, becomes clearer when we appreciate that money as a universal means of exchange plays a central role within society: although everything is not for sale, many things are.

This leads to the level of the imagination. The client can for instance imagine that everything can be bought, or the reverse, that money is of no importance at all. There are many and various meanings, and especially unconscious meanings of money, and it is obvious that one can only gain insight into these meanings through an analysis of the question when it is presented in a concrete form. As an orientation however, one can employ the structure which the theory provides. Firstly, one may consider the structural model. Money dealings can then be seen as serving intra-psychic agencies such as the super-ego. Simple living and meagre spending for one's own pleasures can serve to relieve an unconscious feeling of guilt. But holding out on financial debts can further serve to sustain unconscious guilt feelings without which life would become unbearable. Above all, a debt means the existence of an imaginary relationship: one who is alone and has only debts is, because of them, not alone. The amalgamation of the question of money and guilt has been exhaustively investigated by Freud in the famous story of the Ratman, in which the central phenomenon of a punishment involving rats both obscures and points to the complexities, because 'Rat' also means 'Rate' (= rate of payment).[4]

Since Freud's classic article 'Character and Anal Eroticism', one may, within the framework of the libido-theory, consider the unconscious association of money and faeces.[5] The unconscious may for instance, using a pun, make a connection between posture and possessing. To sit on something may be seen as a way of protecting possessions. In this anal context the dimension of giving and getting, having and keeping is opened up. However, because of the connection between posture and possessing, between money and faeces, money is also something contaminated or dirty, and dealings with money, stink.[6]

It becomes obvious that as well as an anal function, money can also acquire a phallic value when it is used for triumphing and impressing.[7] In the same way it can have an oral aspect when it relates to safety, security and protectedness.[8]

Finally, there is the possibility that money can function as a 'transitional object', in Winnicott's sense, if there is a question of an object which has a place in a sphere between the me and the not-me, between the thumb and the

teddybear. The function of such a transitional object lies in countering separation anxiety because it has a place in both worlds and seems to seal off the prospect of separation.[9] In a certain way, faeces also assume a position between the me and the not-me, and it is a defensible proposition that also money, which is now mine but which will presently no longer be mine, can be seen in this light. Above all, money as a universal means of exchange can appear to bring everything within one's reach and can appear to banish apparent inaccessibility, separation and distinction.

These considerations are important in the interpretation of the manner in which a client deals with money in his everyday life outside psychotherapy or analysis, but they are also of importance with respect to the financial questions arising in psychotherapy or analysis (if they arise). If, for instance, the client is late in paying his account, is he building up debt or showing stubborn resistance? Does he feel that he shouldn't have to pay for the suffering which he has sustained from others, or is he demonstrating power? Does he wish to conduct a relationship of a certain kind, or on the contrary, does he think that in the friendly relationship with the therapist which he aspires to, money questions are inappropriate? Why does one client always pay punctually and the other risk a breakdown in the relationship over even the most symbolic, trivial fee for a session?[10]

From these examples it would appear that money is potentially loaded with all kinds of conflictuous material to which numerous and various fantasies are attached. These fantasies can in principle be interpreted because, being imaginations, they can be juxtaposed to reality where money definitely does have a function. Client and psychoanalyst are both living beings who must provide for their means of existence. They eat, drink, live and move around: activities which always involve cost. Consequently, we may state that the psychotherapist lives from the money which the client directly or indirectly provides, while at the same time psychotherapy always costs the client something, be it little or much: the total cost, a partial contribution, or at least an investment into something which has only long-term effects.

Obscuring the money factor

The realities may lead to conflicts as has been outlined above. The psychotherapist may have difficulty with the idea that he must ask for expenses or even sacrifices, and the client may likewise find it unpleasant that they are asked of him. Psychotherapist and client alike thus encounter each other in the obscurance of the fact that there is such a thing as the money-factor playing an important role in psychotherapy.

An obscurance or negation like this may occur when the financing of psychotherapy is arranged through Public Health funds, because remuneration is

usually not arranged per session, but is arranged through budgets allocated to institutes, so that the per hour cost per client remains unclear. An obscuring of cost can also occur, to a lesser extent, when psychotherapy is partly paid for by means of an insurance policy arranged by the client himself. It may even occur when the client pays for his own therapy, if payment is arranged via giro- or banktransfers. There is less disguise of the matter of money when payment is made by means of monthly cash payments, and even less in the case of weekly or daily cash payments, although these latter methods are unusual (why actually?).

The consequences of this situation may be considerable, or less severe. As far as reality is concerned, the consequences of obscuring the money factor are more or less neglible. Complete disappearance of reality does not of course occur, because the client still has a vague knowledge of the fact that at some stage something must be paid anyway. This then leads to an indeterminate vagueness which may induce in the client the thought that perhaps there is something to be concealed after all. It seems essential that when a client experiences this, he be immediately confronted, because such thoughts, if not discussed, are fatal for psychoanalysis, which aspires to (in)sight, openness, and revelation. However, it also seems obvious to assume that a psychoanalyst who is not at ease with the question of money, will allow it to pass or will not even notice it, so that a kind of unspoken, even unconscious, agreement can come into being in order to let this painful subject rest.

This has implications also at the level of imagination. The existence of an unconscious agreement can imply that both psychoanalyst and patient are in the illusion that they are 'above' the matter. It could also imply that the psychoanalyst enjoys being generous and that the patient finds it pleasant not to have a strict master. They can then encounter each other with complementary attitudes which are acceptable to both, but which remain undiscussed. The complicating factor here is that beneath a particular attitude, an opposite attitude can exist - and mostly will exist - which is thus also unlikely to see the light of day. A client may enjoy being treated with consideration, but deep down he will regret that he has again landed in a situation without clear boundaries, etc. Of course all these actions and transactions can occur with respect to phenomena other than money matters within psychoanalyis or psychotherapy. Questions such as "Am I worth it?", and remarks such as "Business and friendship don't go together for me" are also heard in other contexts, but that does not mean that they should not be faced.

This is especially true for questions and remarks which concern the constitutive level. Psychoanalyst or psychotherapist and client commit themselves to a contract at the beginning of analysis or psychotherapy. If it has been arranged that payment shall come from public funds, they arrange their contract on the basis of legal rulings and on the interpretation prevailing at the time of beginning of therapy or analysis. If this aspect is obscured and the obligations

(even if they are small) are not brought to the attention of both parties, the problematic issues connected with any contract also remain shrouded. This problem concerning contracts, namely the distinction between obligations which one has oneself originated on the one hand, and which have been forced on one, on the other, plays a central role in the history of becoming an individual. It concerns the process of detachment in which the child, after rebelling against his father, steps down and allows the father his right to the mother, while giving her up as a love object. As as result of this the child is freed from submission to the mother and obtains his own place in the microsociety of the family, with all its implicit rights and obligations. Similarly, the configuration of rights and obligations plays a central role in adult life where relationships with not only a second, but also with a third person, are taken into account.

Precisely that configuration of obligations and rights in relation to a third party is offered by the structure of financing of therapy from social service funds. If such a configuration presents itself right at the beginning, it is probably damaging if the issue is not brought up for discussion at that time (if only obliquely or in few words).

For the unconscious experience, still other unconscious meanings may be attributed to, as an effect of which the functional tripartition becomes abolished and psychotherapist and paying agency for instance tend to become experienced as fused, sharing maternal qualities. It is also possible that these qualities are not shared equally, with the effect that the one is experienced as generous and the other as mean. But this can be interpreted in due course, again by bringing the formal structure of the agreement on payment to the fore.

What are the effects of a passive method of payment?

The agreement also contains specific assumptions and implications, and this content has, in its turn, consequences for the continuation of the process. This leads to an additional point. What are the consequences for the therapeutic process, not of misjudgement and obscuring, but of financial arrangements from social service funds?

This is a complicated question which so far has received little attention. The situation differs, for instance, from that in which the psychoanalyst treats the patient without charging a fee.[11] The situation also differs from that in which costs up to a certain amount are reimbursed by medical insurance. In the latter case the client himself has arranged an insurance and he himself remains primarily responsible for the payment. This is not the case in Public Health funds in which a whole population or a population group has acquired certain rights.

This of course has consequences for the way in which the therapeutic process is experienced, in the same way that it makes a difference whether one receives goods or services from the state or whether one must supply these oneself.

Coming to terms with this can take on the forceful tone of "I must have psychotherapy because it is my right". But experience or imagination can of course also reverse this: "Oh yes, what rights?, the social agencies will have the final word, they decide and I just have to wait". The axis on which this pendulum swings is a passive attitude: you should give it to me, versus I have to wait.

Related to this attitude is a depersonalized experience. The client no longer visits Mrs X or Mr Y, but is 'down at the Institute' as the expression has it, which is expressed in similar terms as apply to the somatic outpatient clinics. This could point to the fact that as far as the client's experience is concerned, the psychotherapist and somatic specialist have come to stand on the same level and that a person may go to the one because he has the right to physical health and to the other because he has the right to mental health. Here again the passive attitude is evident.

The complicating factor in dealing with the passive and depersonalizing worlds of imagination and experience is that they are partly based on an indisputably correct perception. On a constitutive level things are such, that one does in particular circumstances, have a right to psychotherapy. This right is not the absence of a prohibition (as the right to freedom of speech) but is a positive right in which the state has in a certain sense an obligation to so create circumstances that this right may find realization. On these grounds, the state may set certain conditions and requirements. These conditions give rise to a not-imagined, but unmistakable, dependence.

Firstly, a psychotherapist, should he desire to be financed through National Health Service resources, must contribute to the maintenance or improvement of health. Secondly, allocation and continuation is often dependent on the approval of the bodies which bear responsibility for implementation of the regulations. Thirdly, checking and therapy-mediating machinery which interposes itself between client and psychotherapist comes into use. There is correspondence concerning client which could be made known to him, it is possible that conversations between the client and the inspecting bodies may take place, there is discussion with the psychotherapeutic institute, etc. In this context the figure of the psychotherapist-civil servant comes into being, and he not only feels dependent on financial bodies and institutions, but he actually is.

This situation has great advantages. A client who in the absence of other arrangements, would be excluded from psychotherapy because of the costs, may now have access to psychotherapeutic services. It is therefore entirely fair that the state or the bodies which are responsible for the execution of the regulations, set requirements and conditions. The psychotherapist too, takes on great responsibility because he always has to examine the question of whether meeting the conditions and requirements is compatible with psychotherapeutic or psychoanalytic goals. Thus it seems that the condition that psychotherapy should improve health from a social perspective is a very reasonable one. Society does have an interest in the health of its members so that they may be

able to participate in the working process. On the other hand, it is indisputable that however important health might be, it is not the ultimate therapeutic goal; this goal rather lies in the sphere of inner freedom and independence. Also, it could be questioned which interferences with technique are acceptable and which are not. If the allocation of resources is limited and would only apply for a restricted period of time (for instance two years), this would no longer be compatible with the traditional mode of functioning of psychoanalysis, in which the undetermined duration is an essential aspect of the technique. Finally, one can ask whether or not the organizational structure within which all this occurs, is an harmonious one or whether it is compatible with the psychotherapeutic or psychoanalytic endeavor. Within the framework of such an organization the possibility for initiative by the client himself is considerably reduced. There is discussion about him, approval is requested for him, payment takes place without his involvement.

Is there a way around these problems? There is a relatively simple though radical solution which would significantly reduce the dependence problem outlined here, and at the same time prevent obscuring phenomena such as were mentioned above to take place. It comes down to the introduction of a realistic individual contribution which is proportional to the real costs. The therapy arrangements must also be adhered to in the sense that finally the psychotherapist and not the institute is paid per session. The individual contribution could be determined according to the client's financial ability and could indeed be small in cases where this is socially desirable or necessary.

Conditions and goals together

In this way financing would be similar, whether it comes from 'semi' government funds or private insurances, or from the client bearing the total cost himself. The similarity is to be found in the fact that the client himself contributes to a greater or lesser extent to the real cost. In this way the problem of obscuring is counteracted as much as possible. Both partners are protected from the 'money plays no role' illusion because in this regard, reality is, or remains, a thing that is built in.

The individual contribution which would thus be a part of all forms of financing, has a connection with the goal of an analysis or a psychoanalytic psychotherapy. This goal is actually the resolvement of dependencies and the anxieties associated with it, and the acquiring of a certain degree of inner freedom, and responsibility for one's own actions. The individual contribution anticipates this goal. This anticipation is not illusionary because a psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy already presupposes the possibility of bearing responsibility. The analytical project is actually carried by its conditions,

namely rules and agreements to which the partners commit themselves and are obliged to adhere to.

Psychoanalysis presumes not only individual responsibility, but also social freedom. Where it presumes the ability of both parties to enter into an analytical contract, it also presumes a social situation in which such a contract is not only nominally permitted, but which can in reality be carried out. Further, when this situation is endangered, psychoanalysis will also strive for the preservation or the establishment of that situation. Thus, in spite of itself, psychoanalysis acquires a political dimension. This dimension is based on the coherence between goals and the conditions of treatment.

This ultimate goal is not in the promotion of health, well-being or welfare, although psychoanalytically speaking there is nothing against this, and psychoanalysis can in fact lead indirectly towards this. On the contrary, the goal is reduced fear and reduced dependency, and increased possibilities for self-determination even when this is accomplished at the cost of well-being or welfare.

Notes

1. Cremerius, 1981.
2. see Chapter 2.
3. Langs, 1973.
4. Freud, 1909, p. 213-4.
5. Freud, 1908.
6. Borneman, 1973, p. 87-127.
7. Bergler, 1951, p. 22-62.
8. Fenichel, 1954.
9. Gedo, 1963; Winnicott, 1980a.
10. Allen, 1971.
11. Lorand and Console, 1958.

Part II

Theoretical Implications

5 Action and rule

When L. Wittgenstein wrote in his *Philosophical Investigations* (paragraph 621): "What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm moves from the fact that I raise my arm?" he initiated a discussion which has not yet ceased bringing pens to paper. This and the subsequent passages, have led to a widely branched action philosophy in which in principle two opposing positions may be adopted. The presupposition of Wittgenstein's remark, is that something does remain when the time-spatial dimension of the repositioning of a body part is removed from the supposed fact that I move my arm. Some theoreticians are inclined to deny that anything remains and attempt to convert the one expression or phrase (I move my arm) into the other (my arm moves). In contrast to this reductionist approach, which broadly speaking acquired a following in the first, pre-war phase of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy, the later generation has taken up the cause which has emphasized the irreducibility of these expressions.[1] Wittgenstein played an important role in this more recent trend, but J.L. Austin has also contributed to it through his own work and that of his students.[2] A central idea in an hermeneutically oriented action philosophy is that there exist a fundamental difference between actions and movements, or that a so-called action language certainly cannot be converted into a language which is only concerned with movement. The statement that actions cannot be explained in mechanical terms using concepts such as 'force' and 'impulse', but only by a consideration of goals, intentions and rules, is also applicable here.[3]

This hermeneutic view will be expounded in this chapter. Firstly, in conjunction with this non-reductionist philosophy, it will be shown that not only are there intentions involved in actions, but that a special internal relationship exists between action and intention. Secondly, it will be made clear that actions and intentions together point to an actor or to a subject which in its turn indicates the presence of language and rules. Because rules fulfill an equally central role in psychoanalysis, these deductions make it possible to alter the perspective and to move across to a psychoanalytic point of view. At this point the concept of imaginary action will be introduced - i.e. that rules are only seemingly adhered to - and this is followed by a discussion of the unconscious background to this form of action. The chapter ends with a discussion of the possibility of interpreting action and imaginary action.

Action and intention

Action and change are extremely closely related. However, one would not want to view every change as being the result of an action, if only for the fact that for instance mechanically induced movements, also effect change. One speaks of an action only when the effected change functions as a goal. A particular change functions as a goal only when it is a goal for an actor or is intended by an actor. The actor then has the means to bring about a particular change, or in other words, he intends to perform an action. Action and intention thus go hand in hand.

How are they related? Is their relationship simply a coincidental one or not? If the relationship is coincidental, it must fulfil at least two conditions. Firstly, the combined occurrence of a real action and the corresponding intention must be causal, i.e. coincidental; secondly, action and intention must be able to be described and identified independently of each other. Here, neither of these conditions can be complied with. If a person intends to go cycling and makes this known, we do not have to wait to see if the person concerned does indeed go out cycling or, for instance, goes flying. We already know the result, not on the grounds of feeling or observing, but on the grounds of the grammar. It is inherent in the grammar of the word 'intend' that when I say that I intend or mean to do something, I will indeed do it. Not doing, possibly necessitates further explanation; doing, no longer requires this. This leads to a second point. An intention can only be defined in terms of an action to which the intention leads, and an action can only be described in terms of a intention of which the action is a realization. It follows from this that actions and intentions cannot be described and identified independently of each other. Taking these two considerations together, we may conclude that between an action and an intention, a non-coincidental (in other words non-external) but internal or intrinsic relationship exists: action and intention are by their nature connected with each other.[4] This implies a non-causalistic, and a hermeneutic conception of action.

The conclusion leads us to this point and no further. One who sees a particular event as an action does not exclude the possibility of explanation, but chooses a particular type of explanation, i.e. hermeneutic understanding. Its basic assumption is that an action is performed with the intention of effecting a particular change or result. One can call this result the internal goal or objective of the action.

Intentionality

Directedness toward a goal - and this is the following theme - points to an actor who directs himself. Which function does this actor perform? The most far-reaching view in this regard is the performative thesis known also as

ascriptivism.[5] This interpretation is based on Austin's earlier differentiation between performative and constative utterances. The latter possess the character of an assertion or description and are therefore true or untrue, while in performative utterances the speaker does not assert (that he does something), but does do something. Through the use of language he solemnizes a marriage, takes an oath, gives someone a name. In the performative use of language the speaker does not describe a quality but accords such a quality to himself or to somebody else. When he says "I act", according to this theory, he does not describe a property or a fact but presents himself as the acting subject who is responsible for his actions. When it is said of someone else that he is acting, responsibility is ascribed to him. The concept 'responsibility' is thus implicit in that of action. There is something to be said for this line of thought if one takes note of the practice of law in which someone is stated to be responsible by a legal decision. But there is also a major objection - i.e. that in this way, the notion of action becomes heavily burdened. It would thus no longer be possible to discuss the extent of responsibility which someone, for instance with respect to an offence, may carry, because according to this view something is an action for which one is responsible, or it is no action. Parallel to this, childish behaviour possesses an action aspect because of the presence of intentions, but one would hesitate before applying the heavy qualification of responsibility to it.

A second and more adequate interpretation of the function of the actor or the acting subject, is related to the internal goal which typifies an action. After all actions are, as we have seen, performed with a particular goal. Thus - and this is of fundamental importance - something can only be a goal for a subject when that goal is 'filed' under a particular description for that subject. Technically expressed, an action has not only a particular internal goal or objective, but this objective must also fall under a description for the subject: it must also function as an intentional object. It is true that one action event can fall under many different descriptions: the internal goal and its description can vary. Thus one and the same event can for instance be described as reading, but also as working, studying, satisfying parents or annoying others. But I am still doing 'something', with the emphasis on 'something' and not on 'I' or 'doing'. The subject, according to this view, is not a priori responsible and active but is defined as directed toward an object. It is not characterized by activity but by intentionality.

Rule-guidedness

How - and this is the third theme - can such a description be made? In the foregoing, intentionality, language and reality were linked to each other. How does that work? How can I possibly mean something by the use of a word?

How can I mean city using the word 'city', mean Rome with the word 'Rome', and cat with 'cat'? A possible answer is: here I have the word, and there the object, and by simultaneously saying the word and pointing to the object, the word comes to mean the object.[6] The meaning could then be determined by the tone and could be ostensively defined. The main objection to this theory is that the meaning can never be exhaustively established in this way. The procedure of definition does presuppose the knowledge that we are dealing, for instance, with a noun and a thing: it presumes knowledge concerning the role which the word has in the language. This procedure thus presupposes what must be clarified. And if we enquire into the meaning of the word, we are asking what role the word has in a particular language or within an aspect of it. Words can thus be compared to tools, according to Wittgenstein. Words are used in a particular way, and that use can be referred to as their meaning. One word can of course be used in many different ways. With the word 'cat', I can indicate an animal species and complain about a particular woman who is not my type, or I can label certain behaviour, i.e. as 'catty'. But the use of a particular word always follows a rule: if it is appropriate to say 'cat', then it is inappropriate to say 'dog'; I can say "I play" or "He plays" but not "I plays". The rules may be narrow or broad, vague or precise, they may change or remain the same, but that does not detract from the fact that they regulate the use of words.

To follow a rule implies that the rule will be followed correctly. Otherwise following a rule would be the same as thinking you were following it. Am I myself able to discern whether I only think I am following a rule or whether I am really following it? One can say: if I call A 'A' and B 'B', and another A occurs, then I can recall the first A, I can remember or imagine it, and establish that it is the same A, and I can thus refer to this last A also as 'A'. But is it really the same A? That cannot be decided, because I can compare the new A only with the image of the first A. This is similar to the situation in which I wish to check the departure time of a train using the image I have in my head of the timetable rather than checking the timetable itself.[7] The result may be satisfactory, but it is not really checking. Checking correctness presumes a publicly accessible entity.[8]

This gives a twofold indication of the impossibility of a so-called private language. Firstly, a language never refers to a reality which is only privately accessible, but always to a reality which is in principle public. Secondly, the impossibility of a private language implies that language itself, as a whole consisting of terms and rules, forms a public and social structure or system.

Reference is thus always made to a public reality and occurs inside the language system which is equally public. Language as an entity of terms and rules regulates the reference to objects and the qualification of qualities. Reference and qualification occur within a particular language system, so that another language system with another set of terms produces another entity of possible objects and qualities.[9] This is of course valid not only for the

impression or perception of objects, but also for other forms of intentionality, such as acting. Actions and intentions also fall under a pre-existent description, and they are in this manner dependent on language.

Rules: the transition to the psychoanalytic point of view

Action is thus language dependent and as such it is rule-guided. As a consequence of this, action, if it is to be recognized as such, is governed by one or more rules which indicate what counts as action.

What then is a rule? Here a rule must be differentiated clearly from a command: an order always being connected to the commander or person who issues the order. This bond is absent in a rule, because, conventionally, a rule is valid through agreement. It is valid only by virtue of its acceptance by the user. A rule is therefore not true or untrue, and neither does it function as a cause. It does, however, validate and guide behaviour which thus obtains the status of action. A rule then, has no legislator but arises out of the rule system and its acceptance. This fact connects the action theory presented here with the psychoanalytic perspective.

Rules are not things located in high spheres, but are put into words by people. When somebody, for instance a child, is confronted with rules for the first time, he or she is not only confronted with the rules but also by the people promulgating the rules. The child will thus initially be inclined to perceive rules as orders which he will, or will not, obey. Subsequently however, he will recognize that a rule is not a command initiated by the other person but is a rule which is only being conveyed by a person and also applies to that person. The child then has the task of separating the person or the actual gestalt of the other from the validity of the rules. If this succeeds, and depending on the extent to which it does succeed, the behaviour of the child is no longer a reaction to the order but is governed by a rule and therefore becomes an action. And to that same extent, the child himself will also function as subject of his actions or as an independent individual.[10]

The acceptance of rules is also accompanied by a break with the previous situation, namely the situation in which the child is not yet an independent subject and in which he thinks he is one with his environment and in particular with his mother. Because rules break into this primary situation of supposed unity, the principle of rules will be associated from the very first with the qualification: non-mother, and that is father. With acceptance of the principle of rules, the supposed unity is replaced by a system of at least three relationships and three persons, whose mutual relationships are regulated by rules which may vary from family to family, but which all express the fundamental difference between mother, father and child: between parents and children, between men and women.

Imaginary actions

With the acceptance of rules not only subjects who comply with the rules come into existence, but also objects that can be described and thus also fall under rules. An entity of subjects and objects manifests itself; in other words, a world is born. The existence of a world, also brings into being an imaginary world. The development of an imaginary world is not only a possibility, but in a certain sense is also an inevitability. It is a possibility, because the distinctions which apply in the social world - for example those between subject and object - are applied to the earlier primary situation. Thus an imaginary world comes into being which appears to be worldly and thus to be governed by rules but isn't really, because what is valid for that world is not valid for a previous situation which falls outside of it. On the other hand, the imaginary world is in a certain sense inevitable because looking back at that primary situation there are no other possibilities available than those which we have at our disposal in our social world. Using Kant's term, we can speak here of 'transcendental illusion': illusion is in principle possible, but it is also in principle, illusion.

In this imaginary world, in which each person lives to the extent that he has not entirely given up the illusion of unbroken unity, the other is not encountered in his otherness but is mirrored in the self image. He is then, not an other who is different, but a projected or imaginary other. The rules which apply here, are not rules which apply to me as well as to others. They are not shared; they are only for me and are variable according to the circumstances. This is an incorrect, inappropriate use of rules. And these actions serve a completely personal goal, not to be understood in universal terms: this goal is in a similar way, imaginary.

We can speak here of imaginary actions. Firstly, failure to carry out one's part of an agreement and, by inference, non-compliance with the legal framework in as far as this has been generally accepted, falls into this category. Next in this regard, is displacement by which a person becomes a substitute for another and functions as an imaginary object, as image gestalt for the other. Lastly, reversed or perverted action also comes into this category, because through perversion the final goal is imaginary in so far as it is concerned with the establishment of lost unity and thus with denial of the difference and especially the fundamental difference, between the sexes and generations, while an action in the real sense is possible only on the basis of this difference.

The unconscious

Why is such an imaginary action called an action? The reason for this is that there are intentions involved, and that the action falls under a description. To

the extent that this description is accepted ("I'm going to sit down", "I'm going to walk", etc.), this action is also conscious.

However, in an imaginary action there is also something which is not accepted and not known. Three examples will clarify this. Someone who does not comply with an agreement knows very well that it should be complied with, but he seems not to know it - because otherwise he would have complied - and he imagines that the rule which has been agreed to is an order. He does not act in a real sense, but acts in an imaginary way, and his deed is an opposition to an imagined command and an expression of his imaginary world. Similarly, an analysand or client presumably knows that he will not get what he wants from the analyst but he seems not to know this and imagines that he has a right to his inclination, while it is the affection of somebody else which he is striving for. His flattery or coercion expresses his imaginary world. In the same way, the subject of a perverse action does know the difference between the sexes and generations, but seems not to know it and he takes refuge in ignorance. His deed is thus an enactment of his imaginary world, where this difference does not count.

On the basis of what one knows, one can act or one can refrain from acting, but the three mentioned examples of not-knowing show a pressing necessity for imaginary actions especially with the particular goal of removing uncertainty. That uncertainty however, can never be removed by an action but only by the acceptance of the insight concerned; hence the repetitive nature of every imaginary action. The actor refuses to admit that his action indicates that he does not accept fundamental rules, does not know the place of the other, and has not realized the difference between the sexes, and that he apparently has no desire to do so either.

As a general tendency these desires allow an escape from the definition and limitation of rules and a return - to a greater or lesser extent - to the primary situation of supposed unity. Because of this tendency, one can call these desires primary, and one can, by contrast, call desires which take account of specificity and limitation by rules, secondary. Secondary desires have as their goal a situation which does not exist but which is possible, realizable and thus, in the strictest sense, also desirable. Primary desires aim, by contrast, for a situation which in the strictest sense is not desirable, because the sought-after primary situation as a world, not only does not exist, but cannot exist as a world either and is thus impossible. Just as secondary desires are directed towards a possible world and are therefore characterized by intentionality, primary desires are typified by the absence of such a directedness and thus by the absence of intentionality.[11]

Because of the absence of directedness towards a possible world, primary desires are thus also impossible to fulfil and are consequently immoderate. On the basis of their immoderate nature, they are liable to form condensations or undergo displacements. In this way they indirectly express themselves, by

forming an intermediary which occupies a middle position between the primary and secondary modes of functioning. Thus actions result which on the one hand follow rules and on the other do not: slips of the tongue, paraphrases, paradoxical actions or apparently external consequences to previous actions; in short, imaginary actions.

Reformulations of imaginary actions, the ultimate goal of which is the primary situation, are not recognized, and are thus to that extent unconscious, but reformulation of such actions is possible. To determine which reformulations are appropriate is the object of interpretation.

Interpretation

In the play of reformulations, change occurs within the entity of identified actions. This occurs by the consistent use of an action language by which interpretations are presented which contain terms such as intention, aim, guilt, etc. but not terms such as cause, force, movement. The hermeneutic action language as such is based on ordinary language but it is not the same, because ordinary language contains many expressions which refer to forces and causes. In hermeutic action language, the range of intentionality is seemingly contrafactually promoted; that is to say, the appearance of facts which the ordinary language conveys is countered. The range of intentionality is then reconstructed in terms of rules and society: action is guided by rules and concerned with the "other".

These are the general principles of action language. However, its psychoanalytical variation contains three special principles. Firstly, the distinctions which are used in ordinary language undergo change resulting in the creation of new action clusters. This is possible because new rules are introduced. The rule which regulates the use of the term 'goal' or 'desire' is thus determined in such a way that one can also speak of something as 'unconscious desire' or 'unconscious goal'. The discovery of unconscious goals or unconscious desires is thus at first not an empirical but a 'grammatical' discovery, which however places us in a position to see action facts in a new way or to see new action facts.[12] An action is no longer what it was, but acquires multiple aspects and qualifications.[13]

A second principle says that these qualifications have not become unconscious by coincidence, but on the basis of incompatibility with other aims, cannot reasonably be acknowledged and must therefore be warded off. One qualification conceals the other. The thesis which propounds the multiplicity of aspects is integrated with that of stratification.

Stratification is bound to a third principle, which implies that the terms which structure the world of a certain individual have not acquired that role by coincidence but on the basis of the life-history of that individual. These

connections however are not causal: it is not the antecedents which cause behaviour to be in accordance with a law or in accordance with a regularity. It is the historical stratification of terms which signifies the whole complex of behaviour and shapes distinct actions. Psychoanalytic interpretation is directed towards finding these kinds of non-causal, meaningful connections.

In the following two chapters further attention will be paid to the question of causality referred to here. In Chapter 6 the important question for psychoanalysis, of whether it is possible to make interpretations of non-causal relationships in a scientific manner, will be discussed. In Chapter 7 it will be argued that causality and freedom are incompatible, and that in fact only the non-causal nature of action-relationships makes freedom possible.

Notes

1. Meggle, 1977; Beckerman, 1977.
2. Austin, 1970 b, d.
3. Anscombe, 1963, 1981; Hampshire, 1959; MacIntyre, 1958; Peters, 1958; Melden, 1961; Ch. Taylor, 1964; R. Taylor, 1966; Winch, 1958; von Wright, 1971.
4. This concerns a reference to the Logical Connection Argument which we encounter in different forms in Melden (1961, p. 43-56), Taylor (1964, p. 26-35), von Wright (1971, p. 91-107) and Stoutland (1970).
5. Hart, 1948-9; Austin, 1970a.
6. Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 6, 10.
7. Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 258, 265; Kenny, 1973, p. 178-203.
8. Wittgenstein writes (1958, par. 202): "And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to *think* one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." See Jones, 1971.
9. Mooij, 1975, p. 38-56.
10. Ortigues, 1969; Mooij, 1987. In making this connection I disagree with the French philosopher Assoun who sees an incompatibility between a Freudian and a Wittgensteinian perspective. In my view, a rule, in a Wittgensteinian sense, do imply 'a bolt which refers to otherness' (Assoun, 1988, p. 199).
11. This fundamental absence of intentionality can be assumed to be bound with the fundamental necessity of what in Freud's terms is called archetypal repression: this repression is necessary for the coming into being of intentionality. (Freud, 1915, p. 146-8).
12. Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 251; Wittgenstein, 1966.
13. Wittgenstein, 1958, Part II, par. XI.

6 Psychoanalytic interpretation

The discussion concerning the scientific status of psychoanalysis is as old as psychoanalysis itself. On the one hand psychoanalysis has been and still is disclaimed as a science because its findings are supposedly fictive and are, at the very least, unable to be duplicated, and on the other hand psychoanalysis is itself uncertain of its place within science. In particular Freud's own style of theorizing, has contributed considerably to this uncertainty. In those contributions in which he reports about his clinical work, he seems to have continually been searching for insight into the behaviour of his patients through the investigation of affective or cognitive factors. This approach is called the hermeneutic one, because the term 'hermeneutic' is, from of old, bound to the theory or the art of understanding (for example texts, habits, cultural patterns).[1] However, the hermeneutic approach has also been added to by Freud's view which incorporates terms such as 'power', 'energy', 'psychic apparatus'. The energetic approach does not focus on correlations between behaviour and experience but aims at explaining changes by correlating them with energetic changes within a supposed psychic apparatus. Unlike the hermeneutic approach, this energy discharge theory does not seek reasons, but attempts to point out causes and can therefore be called causal-deterministic.

The attraction of the energy discharge view is that it creates common ground for psychoanalysis and a particular form of physics. In view of the undisputed scientific nature of physics, the scientific value of psychoanalysis is thus also less suspect. Even if one decides not to use the physics-derived terminology of the energy discharge view (its physicalism), the parallel with physics is still appropriate because both sciences strive to establish laws. Because the construction of fundamental laws is often considered to be the pre-eminent scientific activity, this common ground has protected psychoanalytic theory against the accusation of being unscientific.

Because Freud's psychoanalytic theory so emphatically contains this notion of energy discharge, i.e. a non-hermeneutic component, and because so many have subsequently accepted Freud's position, it is appropriate to consider this theme from the perspective of a philosophy of science: is psychoanalysis really an hermeneutic discipline or not, and if not, is it characterized by an amalgamum of a language of meanings and a language of forces? According to the

main thesis of the book the hermeneutic character of psychoanalysis will be defended.[2] In particular, elementary, psychoanalytic hermeneutics or interpretation principles will be described, and it will be argued that interpretation always occurs within the context of rules. Various general remarks pertaining hermeneutics will be found at the end of this chapter, but first the question of the supposed two-way character of psychoanalytic theory will be discussed: does psychoanalytic theory have at its disposal not only a language of meanings and reasons, but also a language of forces and causes?

Three incorrect assumptions

The thesis of the two-way character of psychoanalytic theory can however not be defended, since the introduction of the causal-deterministic approach is based on three fundamental postulates which are partly unproven and partly incorrect.

The postulate that an activity may only be referred to as scientific if it strives to construct laws is unproven. This thesis itself is not a scientific statement but is a statement concerning science which expresses the opinion that the fundamental principle of causality is not limited in its application to natural phenomena in the sense that physics is, but may also be applied to other phenomena. The universalizing effect of this extension is likewise not a scientific statement but is a statement concerning the universal reach of a particular scientific form, and thus by inference is a statement concerning reality itself. It is thus also not a scientific proposition but a metaphysical one, and as such scientifically as much proven as unproven.

The second postulate is that concept formation should occur uniformly and in accordance with the concept formation which underlies law-like statements. A law or law-like statement suggests that whenever type A conditions are brought about, type B conditions are or will be encountered.[3] It is assumed that the conditions of both type A or type B are unambiguously specified so that it is absolutely clear whether a particular set of facts comes under type A or under type B. Should the specification be ambiguous, the possibility of exceptions would arise, whereas a law-like statement in fact allows no exceptions. Natural concepts do have an unambiguous determination: a metal is gold if all the known properties of gold are present. Concepts which are not natural such as cultural concepts, lack such an unambiguous determination. Concepts such as 'Renaissance man' or 'narcissistic personality' do not contain a number of characteristics which must be present if they are to be considered to be the type in question. A narcissistic personality for example, is characterized by, among other things, an absence of interest in others, emotional aloofness, an absence of depressiveness or an inclination to rage, but if one or more of these characteristics is not present, the typing in question is not necessarily wrong. That of

course does not imply that the concept in question may dispense with any unifying feature - because then it would cease to be a concept - but it does mean that this unity is totally different to that of a naturalistic concept. (The unity can, for example, be founded on an underlying theoretical conception).

The third postulate has to do with the nature of the relationship between phenomena. The relationship in a law or law-like statement is external, in the sense that the meanings of the terms which are used in a law (-like statement) are mutually independent, and that the denoted phenomena themselves are also independent of each other. A coincidental connection should exist between the circumstances of type A and those of type B (B for example, may not be a part of A). Accordingly, the one term must be definable independently of a definition of the other (the meaning of B may not, for example, be a part of the meaning of A).[4]

There is no similar relationship however, in the phenomena pertinent to psychoanalysis: speech perceived as action, and action manifested by way of speech. When somebody resolves to do something or says he means to do something, the realization of this intention is not a coincidental consequence of the intention, which also could have had a completely different outcome. Also the resolve can only be defined as a resolve to realize something, in the way that the realization can only be described as the realization of the resolve. The phenomena with which psychoanalysis concerns itself originate indeed from the speech and action sphere exhibiting similarly non-external, but internal, relationships. Therefore the causal-deterministic approach, which does assume an external relationship between phenomena, requiring an entirely unambiguous concept formation, is misplaced.[5] Thus psychoanalysis does not possess a two-way structure, but is characterized by the consistent development of only one way.[6]

Internal relationships: three types

Can this one psychoanalytic way of internal relationships be characterized further? If we take the traditional distinction between perception, feeling and acting for a start, three types of relationships can be distinguished. The first type is formed by situational relationships or 'reference-relationships'. An example which comes to mind is the relationship between figure and background as known in Gestalt psychology, in which a figure only acquires definition in the context of the background in which it appears, while both the figure and background refer to the observer, for whom they appear as figure and background respectively. Generally speaking, every situation consists of an aggregate of elements which acquire relief in their mutual context for an observer who perceives the situation and has insight into it. This insight consists of a particular description of the situation.

A second type is formed by what can be called 'expression-relationships'. Here there is also no external, but rather an internal connection between expression and what is expressed. Between intention and action, feeling and expression, desire and realization of the desire, there is always such an internal connection: the connection is not coincidental, and the phenomena can be named only in terms of each other.

Finally, we can distinguish so-called 'obligation-relationships'. These are the relationships existing between actions themselves, in which one action necessitates another in a particular way. Someone who has made a promise has bound himself to keep the promise; promise creates debt. Someone who warns somebody will also in his subsequent actions show something of the warning. He who hates somebody will (or should) in his later life, behave in accordance with his hate.

Internal relationships: three characteristics

Here we encounter a notable feature of internal relationships. Someone who qualifies a particular relationship as non-external indicates that the connection between the two components is not coincidental, but is also normative. The word 'normative' is dangerous because of its ethical connotation. However, the normative character does not derive from an evaluation of the components in terms of good or bad, but is to be found in the nature of the relationship itself, which ensures that the two components of the relationship are compatible. Thus the connection between the two components is not externally founded through a causal law, but internally by a rule which indicates that the one component is compatible with the other or belongs with the other. Because of this feature of 'compatibility' or 'belonging', a term derived from Greek, 'deontologic', can be used to describe this form of normativity, a form which is completely neutral in an ethical sense.[7] In this way a particular feeling matches a particular expression, and an expression does, or does not, match a feeling. Thus an action may, or may not, relate well to the foregoing, and the foregoing may, or may not, have a due consequence. But at the same time a situation may evoke a particular feeling, or induce a particular kind of action, and both feeling and action in their turn, may be appropriate or inappropriate to that particular situation.

This brings us to the second characteristic of internal relationships: internal relationships are themselves interrelated. Sorrow (feeling) for instance, goes with a (situational) great loss. An expression is appropriate to sorrow, and with the expression (conceived as action) another action may then be appropriate.

That does not mean to say however, that only one feeling and one action is appropriate to a particular situation. The third and last characteristic of internal relationships is that the rules which regulate the relationship between the

components are apparently often, but not always, so broadly defined that numerous implications are possible. Thus a specific rule allows for - but does not necessitate - a degree of freedom. However, the alternatives which a rule allows are to be found within a margin which is limited by the reach of the rule in question. Thus a multiplicity of references, expressions or obligations is often - although not always - possible with regard to one and the same rule. This is tantamount to saying that a situation, expression, or action does or can possess numerous aspects which may be actualized in varying degrees.[8]

Distortion and psychoanalytic interpretation

The ambiguous character of the relationship between two components as well as the possible numerous aspects of a component itself, consequently allow a variety of possible connections. This has two consequences. In the first place, variety makes it possible that in the course of time, if agreed upon by members of a community, modifications may be made as to what is or is not appropriate. Such modifications are an expression of the fact that the relevant framework of rules and therefore the relevant part of the culture (including all its rule structures) itself is altered. Such a communally accepted modication in the course of time does not alter the internal character of the relationships in question. After modification, the agreed borders between what is and what is not appropriate are redrawn, but there still remain borders. This implies that within a particular culture over a particular span of time, there are always borders with regard to what is appropriate and what is not.

Secondly, the variable margin allows an individual to cross borders either occasionally or systematically. So, for instance, someone who experiences a great loss may feel no sorrow, or someone who has experienced extreme humiliation, may feel no anger (although these would be the appropriate reactions to the situation). Or, someone who does not keep to an agreement, may feel released from his obligations in the matter, although the bases of this breach of commitment are not valid in this instance but stem from another, former obligation sequence. Or, someone finding himself in a situation where he is not getting his due, may find an accordingly negative feeling inappropriate on the basis of considerations derived from another situation, but which are applied by him in this one. In the given examples the perception, feeling or acting is inadequate. A particular perception, feeling or action is not appropriate but is only seemingly so. Therefore, in these cases one can speak of imaginary perception, imaginary feeling and imaginary action.[9]

Psychoanalytic interpretation is primarily concerned with such imaginary phenomena, that is to say with such relationship-distortions. However, it centres not only on distortions, but also on the meaning or background of the distortions.

An example of a situational distortion is provided by the dream. In the first place, the situation depicted in the dream is unclear: current reference-relationships are invalid. But although concrete reference relationships have collapsed, the referring function as such remains intact. On the basis of the intact referring function, and the collapse of the specific reference-relationships, Freud was able to liken the dream to a rebus, which obscures its own meaning, but also offers clues to its understanding.[10] A dream can be interpreted because the dream in its totality, or elements of it may figure against another background. This expanded background or context within which the dream as a whole or elements from it are placed, is shaped by the associations of the analysand. The associations offer a new horizon or context into which the dream does fit, thus appearing to be more comprehensible. In general, it can be said that through the extension of the network of reference relationships, the distortion which results from a shrinking or shifting of the relationship-network disappears, revealing the background as well as the meaning of the distortion, because what is a distortion in a given situation, appears to be appropriate in an original situation. Thus through interpretation, i.e via contextual variation, a network of situations (in the branching pattern of a geneological tree) can be uncovered.

A similar kind of observation could be made with respect to the distortions of expressions of feelings, expectations and wishes. Displacements can also occur here, leading to inappropriate expressions and even to an apparent elimination of expressions as such, or to the apparent elimination of a non-expressed feeling or desire. But, hidden feelings or desires can also be detected by varying the basic context, so that for instance expressionless silence may be interpreted as an expression of anger, or an outburst of anger may be interpreted as an expression of anxiety.

The same applies with respect to obligation-relationships in which the hidden obligatory structure is interpretively sought. There is, for instance, the situation in which someone considers himself released from his obligations, and views particular happenings as incidental, external consequences of his previous acts having no internal relationship with them. Interpretation will attempt to 'undo' the process of externalization and to internalize seemingly external consequences in the action sphere. The process of externalization will also appear to be a tried and proven action-solution of long standing.[11]

The distortion of each of the three internal relationships has its own separate origin which interpretation attempts to uncover by way of context variation. Because psychoanalytic interpretation takes place within an analytic framework in which two people, analysand and analyst, are present, psychoanalyst and the analytic framework itself, are also part of the context of the analysand. The psychoanalytic structure or the analyst himself, may for instance be perceived by the analysand as being coercive. He may, for instance, not want to surrender himself emotionally to the analyst within the analytic framework. Ultimately,

this patient may seduce the analyst into taking up a specifically desired attitude, and in his turn, the analyst will try to encounter the analytic framework and the analysand in specific ways. The danger in this is that a closed circuit may develop in which one person continually adjusts himself to the other. When, and to the extent to which this appears to be happening, the analysis is in principle, doomed to failure because then context variation no longer occurs and interpretation consequently becomes impossible. It is therefore the task of the analyst to always be aware - although this awareness need not be continually expressed - that within the analytic dyad at least a third party is present whom the analysand is taking into account. Then a tripartite configuration comes into being, in which an action, expression or apperception which is inappropriate with respect to the current dyad, is appropriate if this third figure is recognized.

The analyst must also be aware of the possible presence of a fourth figure. The fourth person is neither the real person of the analysand, nor the real person of the analyst, nor is it the distorted image which the analysand has of the analyst. It is the distorted image which the analyst has of his analysand, a distortion which is determined by the analyst's own conflicting past. Such a fourfold configuration leads - just as a double configuration - to stagnation, and thus impedes interpretation for which the variation of numerous concrete distortions is essential.

Distortion and resistance

Every specific distortion is an expression of a resistance to a correct apperception, an adequate manifestation of feeling or an appropriate obligation. Every specific distortion with respect to special rules, is by implication directed against the principle of rule-guidedness.[12] Ultimately, an actual distortion not only blocks the development of insight, prevents the expression of a specific feeling to take place and interferes with succession of actions, but the framework of rules itself, which makes situations, feelings and actions as differentiated entities possible, is destroyed. Therefore, every factual distortion is basically an expression of resistance or an attack on the functioning framework of rules as a whole, and as such it is also an expression of a desire for a situation in which there was, or is, no framework of rules at all. Because through mediation of a framework of rules separation and distinction are brought about, the desired situation is characterized by immediacy and non-differentiation. Thus, every distortion is ultimately directed against the break with immediacy (which is in fact implied by the acceptance of a framework of rules), and tries to restore or to allow to continue an albeit rudimentary situation of non-differentiation and immediacy.

In the way that actual interpretations lead to a gradual resolution of actual

distortions, psychoanalytic treatment in its totality (as a summation of effective interpretations) brings about acceptance of a fundamental framework of rules and thus the acceptance of fundamental separation. To the extent that an analysis becomes more or less a success, the situation of immediacy and non-differentiation, which was and is manifested through distortions, is more or less relinquished.

A theoretical background

Actual interpretations are made through variation of the context of the distortions. This, in itself, is an unending process, because an existing variation can further be varied and a given association can be added to, so that the alteration of the background, consequently implies an alteration of the figure. Thus the unending character of the analytic endeavor implies, retrospectively, a continuous transformation of the past because the perception of the figures of the past alters within the receding horizon of the future.[13] An analysis does not result in the acquisition of a definitive view of the past, but it results in an ongoing revision of the life history as a sequence of situations, expressions and actions, in such a way that through the variation of context, the interaction of figures, expressions and actions becomes more harmonious.[14]

Accordingly, although an analysis offers no prospect of a definitive and final view, the revealing nature of the interpretive process does not exclude a certain means for testing interpretations. In view of the value attributed to increasing harmony, certain interpretations cannot be tested in isolation. But the larger amount of coherence in situations, expressions and actions itself functions as a means for testing correctness, as does the resulting life story or narrative with increased coherence.[15] Further, it is not a question that a narrative corresponds with a previously given reality from the distant past, but the unfolding coherence of the life story offers a means of substantiation. Of course, in general, increased coherence does not include increased correspondence. However, within the analytic framework, increased coherence implies increased correspondence, because increased coherence points to decreased distortion and thus to a greater adequacy of insight, expressions and action. Regarding the reality outside the analytic framework however, the correspondence requirement cannot be maintained, because the analytic framework specifically prohibits the application of non-analytic means (for instance through conversations with his parents) in an imaginary extra-analytical testing research (for instance into the actual youth situation of the analysand). Such a study would disturb the whole interplay of action and supposed contra-action, which is the essential element in psychoanalytic interpretation.

Apart from that, in his interpretive work the analyst is not deprived of tools which have proven their usefulness. The experience gained from previous inter-

pretations in analytic practice can offer a guideline for new interpretations. Freud discovered two forms of distortion: condensation and displacement. In condensation, two or more elements are combined to make a whole, and in displacement, an element which was unaccentuated before the distortion, acquires an emphasis which is misleading. As well as these supposedly universally occurring forms of distortion, specific forms can also be distinguished. Denial, repression and disavowal may occur. In some situations a person may not be seen in his 'otherness' but may function as a so-called self-object.[16] Consequently, feelings may become isolated from their expression. Actions may be perverted or may even appear to be undone.

Alongside these forms of distortion, psychoanalytic theory holds general hypotheses regarding the circumstances in which distortions occur (for example: narcissism, negative Oedipus-complex). However, these views never include laws according to which particular behaviour, coincidentally and without exception, causes other behaviour. The reason that no causal laws can be found in this area, lies in the above-mentioned non-applicability to psychoanalysis of the causal-deterministic view.[17] Psychoanalytic theory has never offered a system of law-like statements and is therefore not a nomologic system. Also, the notions employed by psychoanalytical theory (denial, repression) are just as incongruent with the concepts which function within nomologic systems, because they lack the desired unambiguity.

Psychoanalytic theory does offer a system of (unambiguous) ideas as well as possible (internal) connections between phenomena. Technically expressed, psychoanalytic theory offers a conceptual and apperceptive apparatus, which can be applied in analytic practice.[18]

This apparatus as such cannot be tested in the normal sense of the word. The ambiguous character of the functioning concepts and the non-law-like nature of the conceptions fundamental to it prevent such testing to take place. However, this does not exclude the possibility of inspection, but the inspection does not rest with testing, but with the application of the apparatus itself. If a particular concept or a particular unequivocal relationship is difficult to apply, or if one of them is not harmonious with already accepted concepts and views, then this fact is an argument against the concept or relationship in question. Consequently these ideas or structures will find little application, or none at all, and will finally be eliminated from the apparatus. Above all, application, by concretization of an abstract concept or an abstract view thus offers not only a testing possibility, but also a clarification of the concept or of the relationship in question.

As a parallel to this, the manner in which a legal concept or a legal law is specifically determined through jurisprudence comes to mind.[19] In an analogous way, jurisprudence gives rise to arguments which make a case for or against a law, because in jurisprudence it becomes apparent whether a law is or is not difficult to apply and whether it is sufficiently or not sufficiently compatible with

the already accepted system of laws. This parallel does not exclude the possibility that the concrete criteria by which a law is measured - in this case applicability within the practice of law and congruency with other laws - differ from the concrete criteria by which a psychoanalytic view is measured - in this case applicability within analytic practice and congruencies with psychoanalytic theory.

On the other hand, with respect to both law and psychoanalysis, a completely different relationship exists between theory and practice than does between nomologic systems and techniques based on them. In the case under discussion, practice is not an application of a previously described, unambiguously specified theory, but offers - by way of concretization - inspection and clarification in one.

Given the current discrediting of case-history, the psychoanalytic reappraisal of it[20] may contribute to a revision of a general philosophy of science. This could lead to the loss of urgency in the character of the causal-deterministic straightjacket in which the general theory of science often still finds itself, and which also applies in the objective of much psychoanalytically inspired research. The scientific character of psychoanalysis indeed does not lie in the scientific character of research done on (the effect of) an individual psychoanalysis.[21] The scientific nature of psychoanalysis is to be found exclusively in the scientific character of psychoanalysis itself as a theory and a practice.

Since both the causal-deterministic and the nomonologic approach in psychoanalysis are non-applicable, psychoanalysis is free to postulate and further develop a concept of science which will do justice to its own province. In the development of the appropriate concept of science, psychoanalysis is not an isolated science but it can closely follow the second tradition of the philosophy of science: the hermeneutic tradition.[22] The subsequent development of this concept of science by psychoanalysis must not only lead to a revision of the general philosophy of science, but can also be of importance for related disciplines, if and to the extent to which these wish to be guided by a hermeneutic viewpoint, in which man is perceived as a speaking and acting being, who by speaking, acts and who, through his actions, may be understood.

Notes

1. Hermeutics in this book is understood as a broad movement which is negatively characterized by its rejection of the way of thought of the natural sciences, but positively characterized, by an alternative epistomology for the culture or cultural sciences. Important representatives are found within the German, French and also English orientations in philosophy: Gadamer (1985); Apel (1973); Habermas (1971); Ricoeur (1974); Lacan (1977); Dray (1963); Hampshire (1959).
2. Cf. also Basch, 1976; Gill, 1976, 1983; Holt, 1976; Klein, 1976; Schafer, 1976; Spence 1982, 1987.
3. Hempel, 1966.
4. Sherwood, 1969; Lampl-de Groot, 1985; Grünbaum, 1984.

5. For analogous problems in general psychology, see De Boer, 1983; Strasser, 1985.
6. That psychoanalysis has a two-track character is one of the main theses of Ricoeur (1970, 1977); Lorenzer (1970), and Kuiper (1976).
7. Frankena, 1973, p. 14-18.
8. Wittgenstein, 1958, part II, par. XI.
9. see Chapters 2 and 5.
10. Freud, 1900, p. 277/8.
11. Schafer, 1976, p. 127-155; cf. also Edelson, 1975, p. 43, who emphasizes the evaluative aspect of interpretation.
12. What is here referred to as distortion, i.e. imaginary world and imaginary actions, certainly shows some agreement with what A. Lorenzer calls "szenisches Arrangement" (Sprachzerstorung und Rekonstruktion, p. 81). In a "szenisches Arrangement", for example in acting out, "cliches", i.e. stereotyped elements play an important role (p. 82). Although it is a relevant thesis that repression involves desymbolizing, it is not likely that the cliches are to be seen as the result of a complete desymbolization, as Lorenzer suggests. They don't actually lack the symbolic function completely, but the extent of their references is restricted. It would be better to see them as semi-symbolic entities situated between entities which still fully possess their symbolic or reference function and those which have been totally stripped of it and are thus, according to Lorenzer, unconscious (p.90). Lorenzer's concept would gain unity and would lose some of its inconsistency if he would give some space to the notion of such an intermediate area (i.e. of imaginary world and imaginary actions).
13. Gadamer, 1985, p. 192-274; Lacan, 1977, p. 48; Spence, 1982, p. 279-297; Viderman, 1982, p. 145-164.
14. Kris, 1982.
15. Ricoeur, 1977, p. 861; Leavy, 1980, p. 99.
16. Kohut, 1971.
17. see conversely Thomä and Kächele, 1973.
18. van Leeuwen, 1973; cf. also Wallerstein, 1988.
19. Gadamer, 1985, p. 289-305; Spence 1987, p. 179-188.
20. Wallerstein, 1985.
21. Fischer and Greenberg, 1977, p. 307-345; Luborksy and Spence, 1978.
22. Von Wright, 1971, p. 1-34.

7 The question of freedom and rules

Anyone interested in human action - which also includes speaking - is unavoidably confronted with the problem of freedom: am I free to say what I do; am I free to do what I say; am I free to say what I say or to do what I do? Formulated in this abstract way, these questions appear to be of only theoretical importance, but they also have a practical significance, because the concept of freedom is strongly associated with that of responsibility. It is indeed unreasonable to hold someone responsible for his deeds and omissions when he has been accorded no freedom of action. And he who wishes to abolish the idea of responsibility or to deny the possibility of it, in so doing ultimately dismantles the basis of social transactions because these are based on the idea that the participants in social transactions are free and responsible people who can, in principle, be held responsible for their actions. Although the problems concerning the issue of freedom - bearing these connections in mind - do touch on but also extend beyond the psychoanalytic point of view, their importance is so great - also for psychoanalysis and its aims - that a separate and systematic discussion is justified.

In view of the considerable importance of this issue, it is easy to understand why since the birth of western culture, a great deal of attention has been directed to it. Plato for instance, was concerned with the relationship between freedom and insight.[1] The world as we experience it is determined by coming into being and extinction: what will be is conditioned by what precedes it. Insight or reason however, make it possible to step beyond this world of limitations, and someone capable of doing so can take part in a rational reality beyond it. One who is guided in a rational manner by the insight offered here, escapes determinedness in a world in which everything occurs randomly, and is to that extent, free.

A misunderstanding: freedom versus causal determinism

The tension between a determined world and one of freedom greatly increases with a developing tendency to view this determined world as a reality which is one large mechanism. The ongoing mechanization of the world view means that

that since the classical-modern thinking of the 17th and 18th centuries, it is taken for granted that so-called causal-determinism has a place in discussions on freedom. This deterministic view implies that everything that occurs at a particular moment is completely determined by the preceding situation. Causal-determinism was first applied in classical physics, but subsequently its application has been extended outside the area of physics in the strictest sense, so that human action has finally also been included. Accordingly, the concept 'nature' has undergone a change and has come to mean total reality, in so far as it is imperatively determined by natural laws.[2] The consequence of this view is that the basis of the concept 'freedom' appears to have been lost. As a result, contemporary psychologies, such as some forms of behaviourism which have adopted the causal-deterministic viewpoint in the belief that this is the only scientifically responsible approach, are unable to find a place for what is, in their view, a fictitious entity - human freedom.

On the other hand, there have been attempts to escape from the consequences of this point of view. Kant's philosophy is a model of this intention. Kant was deeply convinced that the thesis of causal-determinism not only destroyed the sense of freedom, but also excluded every form of responsibility or possibility of imputation, as freedom, described in his terms as unconditional spontaneity, offers the ultimate grounds for the imputability of an action.[3] Nevertheless, Kant clung, without being willing or able to allow any exception, to the universal applicability of causal-determinism. But he who wishes to preserve both freedom and causal-determinism is confronted with a contradiction, because freedom must be described as non-determinedness or as a hiatus within the multitude of causes and consequences, a hiatus which because of the universality of the thesis of this determinism, is actually excluded. Kant solved the contradiction, in a variation on the Platonic scheme, by viewing man as a citizen of two worlds: the world of nature and that of a transcendent world of freedom. Due to his participation in the transcendent world, man could also be held responsible for his actions in the sense that they could be imputed to him. There are two objections to this solution. In the first place, it includes a revival of an old idea that there is not one reality but two, and that the latter is the real one. Besides this the transcendent setting of freedom also implies its timeless character, while freedom - however one wishes to further define it - has to do with circumstances in which it can appear, so that it is always bound to the factor of time. The difficulties which one apparently encounters when one attempts to save the notion of freedom, as distinct from any form of causal-determinism, sufficiently demonstrate that connecting freedom with determinism is in all probability an incorrect premise.

The question of freedom and rules

Furthermore, one can question whether the rebuttal or limiting of determinism can offer a basis for the concept of freedom, because such an attempt can only lead to one form or another of *in*determinism.[4] In any case, such indeterminism is bound to produce chaotic, unpredictable behaviour. We are not inclined to call such behaviour free, but rather to seek explanations for such strange and bizarre conduct.

It follows from this that freedom does not suggest the absence of regularity, but rather the presence of it. However, the regularity upon which freedom is based appears to be different from that which emanates from the thesis of causal-determinism in which everything runs according to laws. The regularity upon which freedom is based is founded on resolutions, convictions, feelings and considerations of the person in question. Someone who resolves to do something is - with some exceptions - obliged to carry out his resolve. Someone who follows a particular policy will, according to circumstances, act in line with that policy. His actions follow a line or a rule, and the action in question can thus be called rule-guided.

The actions of a person clearly demonstrate regularity, but this regularity stems from the fact that the person follows a rule. The aporie of the dilemma of freedom versus causal-determinism only presents itself if one fails to understand that this form of regularity is completelty different from that implied in the thesis of causal-determinism. One has its origin in natural laws, the other in the fact that people abide by rules. It is only within the hermeneutic context of rules that there is any point in raising the issue of freedom; this question cannot be meaningfully posed within the context of natural laws. Freedom is not embodied in natural laws but in the sum of all the activities which may be called rule-guided: culture.

The transition to culture

In the light of this line of thought, culture and rules are, as far as their content is concerned, harmonious concepts. The cultural anthropologist, Cl. Lévi-Strauss thus rightly stated that wherever a rule appears, we know with certainty that we are at the level of culture.[5] This means that the properties of rules can be transferred to the culture. If we disregard the multiplicity of rules, there are two facets of importance for the issue of freedom. Firstly, adherence to a rule is always a social concern, because there is always an agreement or, more technically expressed, a contract in play. Secondly, rules bind those who follow the rule because they establish obligations with respect to what is or is not appropriate. In view of the close relationship of rules and culture, the acceptance of culture is bound with the taking up of contractual obligations.

Such obligations also place limitations on freedom. On which freedom? The freedom which preceded the acceptance of a framework of rules in any form. Entry into the order of rules and culture is thus coupled with relinquishing total freedom in which one was both - in a negative sense - free from any obligation, and - in a positive sense - free to assume any obligation.[6]

The transition from a natural situation to culture has been a subject of many writings. It is the classical theme in social or political philosophy or in the philosophy of culture, in as far as it directs itself to culture in the broad sense of the word, which is what is intended here. Various philosophers, such as Th. Hobbes, J. Locke and J.-J. Rousseau, have described the transition from what they call the 'natural situation' to the cultural situation in various ways. Rousseau became the best known with his concept of a 'social contract'.

The transition from a natural situation as described to one in which reciprocal relationships are entered into, is not only a theme of social philosophy but also one of psychoanalysis. There is however, a difference between the two approaches; it lies in the fact that in psychoanalysis one is not concerned with a change in the way of life of collectives, but of individuals. For psychoanalysis describes how every child makes this transition in the course of its development, during which it changes from a newborn child to a future adult. M. Mahler calls this second birth a psychological birth, but it is more appropriate to refer to a cultural birth.[7] In this second birth the child relinquishes a position in which it held itself to be the centre of the universe, with everything open to it. The child then acquires a new position in which it takes up its own albeit restricted place, and together with others, starts adhering to rules. The acceptance of a particular culture and thus of culture as such, is in other words equivalent to the relinquishing of the early childish narcissistic position, which is characterized by an enticing but also threatening total freedom.[8] Thus culture certainly does not imply freedom or increase of freedom, but on the contrary, implies bonds. Culture however does make an integrated and limited freedom possible, but new conditions must first be met.

Freedom: three factors

In view of the fact that freedom is concerned with individuals or subjects, the first condition is formed by the presence of a *subject*. Strictly speaking this is not a new condition, because the presence of a subject is already a given fact with rules or culture. For a rule or culture does point to a subject to whom the rule or the culture, as a sum of rule-guided activities, applies. But a subject of rules is not a free subject. The framework of rules can for instance be so narrow, that it allows the subject no freedom at all. The presence of a subject is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition of freedom.

A second condition lies in the possibility of *reflection or awareness*.[9] This

really is a new condition, because reflection or awareness is not yet an automatic consequence of the following of a rule: one can for instance speak a language very well without possessing any reflective knowledge of that language. The new condition of reflection or awareness is also a necessary condition, in that a subject who has no knowledge of what he does - in the strict sense that he cannot know what he does - is not able to reflect. And one who is not capable of reflecting is unable to refrain from action, and is thus in this sense not free.

But although this possibility of reflection is necessary, it still is not sufficient. It is indeed possible that an individual did know what he did, and on the basis of knowing could have refrained from acting, but that in spite of knowing, he had to resort to the action in question because he was unable to think of a viable alternative. It is true that finding a viable alternative presupposes reflection, but it requires more. Thus a third and last condition is *ingenuity and critical sense*. If this factor is present, the acting subject is not only capable of considering a given action, but also to develop action-alternatives and to test these alternatives for workability and reality.

The three freedom factors outlined can be considered together, particularly because they are all concerned with inner capacities of human beings and fall under what is called *inner freedom*. By inner freedom we mean the capacity to initiate new activities or to approach the same activity in a different way. Inner freedom may also, as is the case with all forms of freedom, function in a positive or a negative sense: in the one case, one is inwardly free for something and in the other case one is inwardly free from something. Inner freedom has as its opposite - external freedom (which in its turn, can of course also be interpreted in a positive or a negative sense). By *external freedom* we mean the latitude which a particular frame of rules, norm pattern, or culture segment, allows. In view of the interrelatedness of external freedom and inner freedom, it is important to realize that the one is meaningless without the other. For instance, a member of a tolerant society has considerable external freedom, but due to his inner unresolved problems may be unable to make use of the freedom offered. Lacking a viable alternative, he is therefore not free. On the other hand, inner freedom can only develop if there is an external system of restrictive rules or a culture present. Thus culture makes a limited, inner freedom possible, but at the same time makes a non-restricted, absolute freedom, impossible.

Not only does culture foster inner freedom, but also finally the bearing of responsibility. Responsibility is intimately connected with freedom, because someone who is free in the sense of the foregoing, can also be held responsible for his deeds and shortcomings.[10] A free subject is then by definition a responsible subject, i.e. responsible in the fundamental sense that he is accountable. This responsibility applies only in a fundamental sense i.e. in principle, because a subject is responsible in a real sense only if he has taken real responsibilities upon himself or has had them designated to him by third parties who have the

power of designation: freedom makes the bearing of real responsibility possible because freedom in this sense, and fundamental responsibility, are identical.

Boundaries and the repositioning of boundaries

On the other hand, a consequence of this interrelatedness of the conditions is that the basis for accountability is lost if one of the conditions of freedom is not present: freedom and responsibility are not possible without a subjective position, reflection and critical sense. Thus, a natural event which by chance involves us, but which we have no part in as subject, is not our responsibility. And one who is unable to look at and reflect upon the results of his own actions - for instance because they could not reasonably have been foreseen - is not responsible for them.[11] And finally, one who acts on the basis of a non-rectifiable error and is then absorbed in a delusion, is likewise not accountable because a mind in such a state is not open to discussion or criticism.

Although three fundamental boundaries are drawn here, these borders are in fact not well delineated. In the first place, it can turn out that someone who has had an accident or disease, which appeared to be a chance, natural incident, has in fact, as subject, brought it about himself. Secondly, everyone is to some extent ignorant of what he does, because an action always contributes to what follows, so that in the light of what follows, the preceding may be altered. As far as the third factor is concerned, everyone has to a greater or lesser extent beliefs which are not directly amenable to criticism because of their private nature, but which may on the other hand, be expressed indirectly by means of a dream or a slip of the tongue and thus become accessible for discussion and criticism: these are the so-called 'unconscious' thoughts or beliefs, in the narrow and strictly psychoanalytic sense of the word.

The actual blurred character of the boundaries between nature and culture, behaviour which is reflected upon and behaviour not reflected upon, and between conscious and unconscious in a psychoanalytic sense, implies the existence of a domain between freedom and non-freedom. The existence of such an intermediate domain lends an arbitrary character to statements about freedom and responsibility, but it also offers the possibility for strategic operations because, in this way, one may choose to emphasize the aspect of freedom and responsibility of an incident, or not to do so.[12]

Above all, the existence of a margin between freedom and non-freedom, means that it is in principle possible, by way of freedom-enlarging activities, to reduce this margin and thus to reduce non-freedom. Psychoanalytic treatment aims towards such an expansion of freedom: natural or pathological processes can be increasingly incorporated into the action-sphere, the area for reflection can be extended, and what was unconscious or 'private' and thus inaccessible, can become subject to discussion and criticism.

Boundary transgression?

Is there a limit to the extension of freedom, or is the domain of freedom and responsibility, in principle, limitless? If someone can be held responsible for his individual actions, can he also be held responsible for his life as a whole, and furthermore for the framework which encompasses his life? An affirmative answer would mean that we should be able to choose this framework ourselves because responsibility must presuppose freedom. The basis of this answer is the view that freedom is total and knows neither beginning nor end and that every appeal to values or rules amounts to an attempt to escape from the freedom to which human beings are condemned.[13] In contrast to this, is the view that frameworks of rules strictly determine actions and that there is no possibility of escaping their determining power.[14]

In this discussion, freedom which is viewed as indeterminateness by rules, and rule-determinism are opposed to each other analogously to the way that formerly, freedom defined as causal indeterminateness and causal determinism were opposed to each other. The earlier dilemma came about because freedom, defined as causal indeterminateness, was confronted with causal determinism and came to be placed in a domain where the question of freedom has no place, because in this domain freedom can only appear as chaos within nature, in other words as something which actually has nothing in common with freedom. The present dilemma exists, not because of a similar categorical confusion, but because of a failure to appreciate a difference in level (within the same category). The present dilemma does recognize that freedom, and thus also responsibility, is not related to natural laws but to rules and culture. But if freedom and responsibility are only to be found within frameworks of rules, there is no point in asking (in terms of freedom and responsibility) precisely what precedes the possibility of freedom and responsibility. Furthermore, there is no point in arguing that, in respect to the framework which encompasses our lives or the fundament within which our lives are embedded, we are free or unfree, or respectively, both free and unfree, because the question itself, cannot be asked. Thus freedom is sited, and limited, by the frameworks which make it possible and in respect to which, transgression is impossible.

Freedom: marginal and precarious

It is apparent from the discussion so far, that freedom as it is defined here, occurs in a margin. Freedom indeed presupposes not only culture or rules, but also what precedes culture (nature) and follows it (consciousness). Freedom is to be found on the edge of a solid complex which is formed by natural processes, unconscious and conscious cultural processes. Freedom is thus not a fact but a task, not assured ground but territory which has to be conquered.

But freedom certainly can be conquered, and this is supported by the idea that culture itself inclines towards freedom and increase of freedom. This is more easily understood if we pay attention to the process by which an individual enters into the culture and adheres to the rules which apply within a culture. When and to the extent that a subject follows rules, these rules have an intermediary role between subject, the world and other subjects who also adhere to the rules by which differentiation and separation come about between subject on the one hand, and the world and others, on the other. Entry into culture is thus an entrance into the world of mediation, and simultaneously brings about a break with the situation of immediacy and non-differentiation which preceded it. Continued participation in a particular culture and within culture as such, therefore implies a process of detachment. This process of detachment is, as here indicated, also a process of increasing separation and increasing differentiation, so, of increasing individuality. Individuality implies independence, and independence in its turn refers to freedom. Thus an inclination towards freedom is to be found at the heart of culture.

But a cultural inclination or tendency is no more than a possibility; it is not a given fact of culture and remains only a goal to be striven for. Thus in its tendentious capacity, freedom remains precarious.

Ambivalence

A final question is whether this uncertain freedom should be promoted or not. On the issue of the desirability of freedom we now leave the descriptive approach for a normative one. In an ethical discussion on the desirability of freedom, freedom as a value should be set against other values. Such a discussion cannot be confined to an evaluation of the value of freedom versus that of non-freedom, because freedom is not an isolated entity but is intrinsically bound with other entities.

Generally speaking, two value complexes are to be found within our culture. The first is formed by the triad of freedom, responsibility and - because of the importance of inner freedom and personal responsibility - individuality. The second complex of values is formed by the triad equality, concern (that this equality is realized throughout the whole society), and collectivity.

It is important to note that the relationship between freedom and equality as values, contains a potential contradiction because the promotion of equality involves the promotion of regulations, the goal of which is to make an unequal situation less unequal but which, if they are to have the desired effect, reduce freedom, at least in its external sense and also deprive the individual of implicit, real responsibilities. Although these consequences do not affect fundamental individual responsibility, it is likely that a view which emphasizes collective concern, will stress responsibility less than a view which chooses freedom and

responsibility as its point of departure. Because of the increased complexity of contemporary society, the idea of collective concern has gained considerable ground. Apart from the real fruits which this idea has borne, the blossoming of collective concern, taking account of the antagonism between the values in their realization, is inevitably at the cost of individual responsibility. And when one sees growth through freedom as something progressive, one should not be blind to the fact that increase of collective concern, irrespective of its fruits, in this respect has an opposite and thus regressive effect.

If this view is not popular, it is because freedom itself is not popular. The origin of the fact that freedom is not popular cannot be found in freedom itself, but in the appeal which the concept of freedom offers, because freedom points inevitably to individual responsibility. The experience, and in particular the psychoanalytic experience, shows that the process of individuation is a highly ambivalent one, striven for by the young child (later when I'm big) on the one hand, but also deeply regretted on the other hand when this same child has become an adult. Thus freedom is praised for what it can obtain and because it has been obtained, but it is also secretly regretted, because with the increase of freedom and independence something is also lost: a situation of immediacy and protectedness. If, and to the extent to which, the desire for such a situation (which can be manifested in many ways including social ones) is not given up, freedom continues to receive both positive and negative appraisal and thus continues to be an ambivalent notion.

This ambivalence ultimately explains the precarious position of freedom within contemporary culture and, one can surmise, within culture as such. This ambivalence does not only make the position of freedom precarious, but also the position of psychoanalysis because psychoanalysis not only has the expansion of freedom as its goal but also brings about an increase in individual responsibility.

But psychoanalysis is also itself a part of culture. This means that it does not only encounter this ambivalence towards itself in the culture outside, but that as a cultural phenomenon, it also possesses a similar intrinsic disunity. The following, final chapter connecting the main themes, will elaborate on this.

Notes

1. Plato's *Politeia* comes to mind, VIII, 514a-517c.
2. Kant, 1956, B XIX.
3. Kant, 1956, B 472-480; 560-586; 823-838.
4. de Boer, 1983, p. 63.
5. Lévi-Strauss, 1949, p. 10.
6. Berlin, 1969.
7. Mahler, 1975.
8. That the early narcissism of childhood has been described by different authors of course in different ways has no significance for the following line of thought.
9. Winch, 1958, p. 63.

10. cf. Moore, 1984, p. 47-49; Mooij, 1986.
11. Kenny, 1966.
12. Schafer, 1976, p. 145.
13. Sartre, 1943, p. 487-615; for a criticism of Sartre see Taylor, 1985 and Warnock, 1973.
14. Lacan, 1977, p. 284.

8 Psychoanalysis and philosophical anthropology

Philosophical anthropology is a part of philosophy, along with social philosophy, philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of culture. One kind of question which can be raised in these areas is metaphysical in nature: "What is man?" A second kind of question has its origin in the positive sciences and investigates the formal methodological or the conceptual analytic aspects of actual procedures. In this light philosophical anthropology is no more than a theory of the contemporary human sciences.

By way of the first kind of question one hopes, circumvening the context of established sciences, to be able to determine "What is....". A disadvantage here is, that with the formulation of the question, a choice for a particular sort of metaphysics is already made, namely a thing-metaphysics. Above all, a certain naivety is inevitable because corrections and adjustments which have been made to particular traditional views are ignored. The disadvantages of the second kind of question are of a similar character. By assuming the 'factum of the sciences', one implicitly chooses for the special anthropology which is embodied by a particular science, adopting at the same time, the presuppositions of that science which are taken for granted. Also of particular significance here, is the prejudice that scientific knowledge and action is in principle different from knowledge and action in areas which are not specifically scientific.

Another beginning

Let us try to limit dependency on to the prevalent attitudes as much as possible and to deny both the philosophical question "What is man?" and the established sciences, a privileged position. We do however, need a point of departure from which the potential philosophical-anthropological question can be developed.

In this final chapter we examine the extent to which the psychoanalytic situation offers such a point of departure. Initially, this choice may seem to be a rather arbitrary restriction. But that is purely an impression, because the analytic situation is a differentiation of the speaking or dialogue situation as such, which is possibly not essential for man but which is certainly universal. As a differentiation however, the analytic situation offers in fact not a constriction

but a radicalization of this. The recounting of events and experiences is characteristic of the speaking situation and the analytic situation is also characterized by this, but more particularly by the requirement that in the presence of another person, one does not selectively recount particular events and experiences, exluding others, but that one recounts non-selectively everything that comes to mind. If we start from the analytic situation, we avoid the choice of particular narratives or interpretations, but we begin with the existence of stories or interpretations as such: thus, not a particular story, but a narrative in itself, is the 'fait primitif' of psychoanalysis.

A first level: the speech situation

A first level of enquiry is indicated by the question of what happens in a story. Every story or narrative can be broken up into formal elements. There are many methods of analysis, from simple parsing of a sentence in subject-predicate, to so-called narrative analyses in which concepts such as perspective of telling and time of telling, play a role.[1] Subsequently, the forces which are at work in the story can be examined, as well as the purport of speech utterances. Here we refer to a speech act analysis, which examines the difference between a promise and an assertion and which also investigates whether a particular utterance is an assertion or a threat disguised as an assertion.[2] Finally, the functions of the story can be examined. Every story for instance is a presentation, because it presents a man and his world. When something or somebody is also spoken of and it acquires the position of object, the narrative is also an objectification. And in so far as the teller plays a role and acquires a particular identity which differs from that of other personages featuring in the story, the narrative is also an identification.[3]

A second level: conditions for a dialogue

The forms, effects and functions mentioned above, can be brought together under a common denominator; they are all interpretations. They suggest the more fundamental function of interpreting as such. Simple registration of pure facts is not possible, because even the most elementary report contains an element of interpretation, which is found merely in the choice of words used. Every story is an interpretation, and presupposes the activity of interpreting in which segmentation and articulation occurs. In speaking, the given information is always 'marked' or symbolized. An actual interpretation or symbolization presumes such prior activity of interpreting or symbolizing.

Further, an essential element in the situation is trust; both partners in the dialogue may, to a greater or lesser extent, desire the other to be trustworthy,

so that both will do what they have agreed to do or will adhere to what has been agreed.

A third condition is formed by the basic assumption that the other person can actually be addressed, and this also of course concerns both partners. It carries the assumption that the other will respond to a question and explore the question without avoiding it. He must be able to elaborate upon or explain what he has said, and to answer. However, being able to answer does not imply that the speaker is responsible for what he says or doesn't say.

We have, in general terms, given three conditions for a dialogue: the symbolic function of the speaking subject, mutual trust, and addressability of the partner in dialogue. These conditions apply not only to analytic dialogue, but to all dialogue, because the analytic situation offers a radicalization of the general speech situation. These are the preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled if a dialogue is to be possible.[4]

Intermezzo

The three conditions are formulated in such general terms that taken as such, they are compatible with a philosophy which has its origins in human subjectivity. Viewed in the light of such a philosophy, the three conditions can be specified in the following manner. One may view the symbolic function as a manifestation of the spontaneity of the human mind which bears a fundamental symbolization.[5]

Subsequently, with respect to the second condition, entering into a special contract may be seen as a specification of a general social contract which, in its turn, is based on the mutual trust between already particularized subjects.

Finally, the notion of addressibility is very closely bound to the appreciation of man as a rational being. Thus, a person is considered to be able to justify himself, to give reasons for his acts and shortcomings such that sufficient reasons can be established for his speech and behaviour. Thus, in this light, man as a rational being may also be called responsible.

It is true that these three extrapolations do not follow necessarily from the conditions; they are not contained in them because they extend further, but they are connected with them and no contradiction exists.

The three extrapolations nevertheless do raise some valid questions. One can for instance wonder if symbolizing really is an original activity of the human mind and nothing more. In Cassirer's view, symbolization implies the attachment of mental meanings to physical entities (as sounds).[6] Here the objection can be raised that the supposed mental meaning is not primary at all, but is secondary and that the segmentation of the meanings articulated within a

language is, for instance dependent upon the configuration of the terms of the language concerned.[7]

And then, on the question of trust? This trust is in essence a trust in the good intentions of the other. Such trust is not unfounded, for why would one doubt the good intentions of another beforehand? Nevertheless, the certainty that the contract will be honoured cannot automatically be derived from this trust. How do I know, to remain with the example of the analytic contract, that the other is telling (or is attempting to tell) everything that comes to mind? How do I know that the other is listening? How do I know that I myself am listening to everything, or that I am trying to do so? One often recognizes at a later stage that one has withheld something or at the time didn't really listen in spite of good intentions. Trust in good intentions is thus not unfounded, but does not offer sufficient basis for the contract.

Finally, with respect to the third extrapolation, we can question whether man is completely responsible for his speaking and acting and in particular in the specific area in which speaking and acting is pertinent, namely where human products have a symbolic value. The utterance of meaningless sounds is not speech; being blown away by the wind is not action. ("But..", the psychoanalyst will ask, "did being blown away really have no meaning?"). Can I be absolutely certain of my motives, or must I conclude that an absolute knowledge of the implications of what I say or do is impossible, and that the desire for this is a fantasma.

If these questions with respect to the three extrapolations are legitimate ones, then the three conditions of dialogue must also be critically examined, because they are interrelated. If our critical enquiries are to be convincing, we must reformulate the three conditions in such a way that these extrapolations are impossible. We must then search for a another level which precedes the conditions, and which determines and limits their extent.

A third level: a framework of rules

Along the lines of the three questions, the following objections to the three extrapolations can now be presented.

Is the symbolic funtion a fundamental and non-reducible fact? Linguistic symbolization does occur within a particular language; a subject can only articulate a certain situation within a particular language. Added to this is the consideration that a speaking subject does not create the symbolic universe of language but encounters it as it exists. The speaking subject does not design the language with its grammar and vocabulary but subjects itself to it. It is in a position of 'bondage' with respect to the language. This bondage is not limited to the language and its structure, but it also extends to the whole complex of narratives and of interpretations which are part of a particular culture and

which define what is attractive or what is ugly, desirable or forbidden, pleasurable or horrible. Finally, this bondage also concerns the symbolic systems which regulate action, such as the existing written and unwritten laws. The language, the entire range of functioning interpretations, and the codes which regulate action, together can be called the symbolic field of rules. Human existence is enclosed within a symbolic field or a framework of rules, because speaking occurs within a particular language, an actual account is a variation of another story, and an action must comply with a particular norm if it is to be viewed as a particular action. That is not all. The symbolic field surrounds not only human existence, but it also forms the conditions for the possibility of such an existence. Without such a framework of norms, interpretations and grammatical rules, there is no possibility of individual speech, recounting or action. If this formulation is valid, the implication is that the symbolic function is not irreducible, but in its turn refers to a symbolic field or symbolic order, a framework of rules.[8]

This referral leads to a second correction: a symbolic field or order is a public entity. Its public character is based on the communality inherent in the use of rules. The reason for this is the impossibility of following a rule privately.[9] A framework of rules thus points to the entirety of others without whom this framework cannot manifest itself. The other does not have to be present in a physical form, but his function as a speaker and an addressed person, is always assumed. A consequence of this however, is that any monadologic conception of subjectivity is unthinkable. Any interpretation of an original subject which would later encounter - in a real or ideal genesis - the other, is fundamentally incorrect. We should recognize that this notion of an original subject is anchored deeply in Western thought. (To avoid misunderstanding, it should be noted that this 'primacy of the other' is ethically, absolutely neutral). The result of this position is that trust in the good intentions of another is no fundamental requirement for the contract, neither the analytic nor any other contract. The contract already functions, and always functions, because without it, there can be no question of the existence of a symbolic field or order. The question of acknowledgement of the other and the recognition by the other are on the same level as the adhering to a symbolic field of rules. The future subject is only a subject if and to the extent that it participates in the reality of mutual recognition within a framework of rules. The function of the other is therefore a condition for the manifestation of a subject: the other is a sine qua non. Doubt at this level does not elicit doubts of the good intentions of the other, but causes the other to disappear in his capacity. However, this radical doubt is meaningless, because at the same time that the framework of rules would cease to function, along with it the subject as a doubting subject would cease to be. Furthermore, from a vertical perspective, doubt ends in an unfounded but founding trust in the functioning of a framework of rules and of the other; further questioning is meaningless.[10]

However, viewed from a horizontal perspective endless doubt is possible. Why would one way of expressing something be the only way? Every word provokes an answer; interpretation demands further interpretation. A particular complaint or a particularly defined problem already has a definition and allows itself to be redefined. Every desire represents another desire. An interpretation can be corrected or reformulated and offers, in its turn, material for further interpretation, etc. etc. This implies that a definitive justification is precluded. Every justification is lost in indefiniteness. Naturally one can stop at a certain point but the choice of this point is arbitrary and thus not decisive. Ultimately this would mean that man as a speaking subject is addressable, but can never be held completely accountable for what he says and does.

This is the third correction to the above three conceptions of the philosophy of subjectivity by which we have simultaneously determined a level by which the terms of dialogue in general, and the analytic dialogue in particular, are conditioned.

A double separation: separation and splitting

According to the theory as presented here - taking the psychoanalytic, and thus the dialogue situation in general as our point of departure - no reality either as subject or object exists outside a framework of rules in which symbolization occurs. What then is it that really happens? The answer to this question carries us *from* the problem of the conditions of dialogue *to* the domain of genesis and in particular of the emergence of the subject and of the object. It can be said that in symbolizing, the immediacy of experiencing is exceeded by its symbolic expression. A distancing with respect to the original experienced reality of immediacy takes place, by which the speaking subject and the object about which he speaks, gain independence of each other. An object becomes recognizable and acquires its identity as a special object by the symbolism bestowed upon it. That is the gain but there is also a loss. The as yet undefined 'object' of immediate experience and thus immediate experience itself, ceases to exist. This has to be considered a loss, because one needs the medium of language to enter into reality, and in speaking one loses immediacy with respect to reality. In this regard we support Cassirer as he writes that the paradise of immediacy is closed.[11]

This does not mean that this paradise offers no fascination or appeal. In everyone there is, to a greater or lesser extent, a veiled, indestructible wish for a situation which would restore the paradise of unity. The partial realization of this desire leads to actions, expressions or perceptions which seem to bring the sought after situation nearer, but which then cease to be actions, expressions or perceptions in their true sense. These phenomena try to undo the initial distancing. Abiding in such an imaginary world, in which one lives according to the

extent to which one has not given up the insatiable desire for such an unified state, is ultimately fatal, because complete submission to the fusional desires and therefore reversing the separation which resulted from the entry into a symbolic field, is a deadly thing: the separation of the future subject and his world, and separation of the subject and the other is then nullified.

The acceptance of a framework of rules is, along with separation, accompanied by a splitting of the subject himself. Just as the relationship with the other is mediated through a symbolic field, the relationship of the future subject to itself is transformed from an immediate to an non-immediate one. Symbols come between a still undifferentiated desire and its diffuse fulfillment. Desires then become increasingly differentiated and the relatively undifferentiated desire which tends towards a situation of non-differentiation and immediacy, is excluded. These are the unconscious desires which function in the manner of a primary process in contrast with functioning within a symbolic field which in accordance with this terminology, can be called 'secondary'. And even if an imaginary world is located between the conscious and the unconscious, this intermediate position does not do away with the fundamental splitting within the subject of the unconscious and the conscious, between the primary and the secondary process.

Implications

Psychoanalysis begins, as we have seen, with an invitiation to speak and to put into words the relationships which one has with others and with oneself, and to recount one's own history. Psychoanalytic theory however, goes beyond this and for instance raises the question how it is possible to have human relationships anyway, and examines not only the subject's history but also asks what preceded that history, i.e. the coming into being as a subject.

What is originally considered a fact - the existence of historical connections between particularized subjects - then becomes a question. The question concerns the conditions under which the establishment of connections or relationships is possible, how a subject as such is able to function. This can be called the anthropological dimension of psychoanalysis, because what is supposedly examined, is precisely what preceded the historical and relational level.

Here, as above, it seems that the subject is not an original fact but is a derived instance which presupposes a symbolic field of rules.

This thesis opposes both a naturalistic and an idealistic view of man. The naturalistic view sees man as a part of nature and does not recognize that the human form of life implicates a break with nature. An idealistic view by contrast, does recognize the rupture, but localizes it within the human spirit. Since classical modern thinking, the history of philosophical reflection clearly shows the tendency towards an idealistic view. Descartes' doubt-experiment resulted

in the thesis "I think, therefore I am", and on the basis of the indubitability of the *cogito sum*, human subjectivity was understood as 'cogito' and was taken as the departure point for further systematics. Subsequent refinement by Kant and by Husserl has only served to reinforce this central position.

Here we have to realize that the term subject originally had absolutely no special relationship with man. The term is a translation of the Greek *hypokeimenon* which means ground.[12] If man is explained as a subject, this means that he is seen as the being on which everything is founded. But if the subject, in his turn, presupposes a language and a symbolic field with respect to which transgression or transcendence is impossible, man can no longer be understood as hypokeimenon, as that which the world in its final appearance is ultimately and definitively concerned with. This correction is then the narcissistic injury which psychoanalysis inflicts on a particular view of mankind itself. And indeed all real psychoanalytically-orientated findings confront us with astounding but also frightening material for the thesis of far-reaching symbolic determination of speaking and acting, and with insight into the extent to which the other speaks and acts where the subject thinks he speaks and acts himself.

Is it then still appropriate to speak of a subject? This is permissible but no longer in the traditional sense of hypokeimenon, no longer as only a bearing, but also as an underlying and passive principle. Thus language unlocks the function of a subject by freeing the future or potential subject from a world of imagination and illusion. The openness which follows, is not an unrestricted consciousness but a symbolically qualified openness. This openness presupposes prior containment.

Dissent within pyschoanalysis

But is this then the last word? One can remark, that although it is through language that speaking is possible, I still speak, and although it is rules that make action possible, I still act. What happens to the subject happens because the subject allows it to happen. Receptivity does not exclude activity but actually fosters activity, and even freedom. If psychoanalysis speaks of the impotence of the subject, at the same time it speaks of its power. Thus, in the heart of psychoanalysis we find criticism of an all-powerful subject and also of the roots of such a powerful subject. We again see this ambiguity in the rift between analytic theory on the one hand and analytic practice on the other. Analytic theory affirms a predominance of the order in language and rules and a predominance of history and the personal prehistory, and summarizes this in the saying: "The ego is not master in its own house."[13]

Besides the 'being' of analytic theory, there is the 'shall be' of analytic practice. The goal of an analysis was indicated by Freud with the words:

"Where id was, there ego shall be".[14] The goal is that a subject sees the light of life where first only non-differentiation and immediacy prevailed.

But between the first and second remark, we find the word 'becoming', a word indicating a continuous process. It divides the actual situation definitively from the goal and ensures that the goal will never be a once-and-forever achieved fact. The fundamental finiteness of man is evident in the light of this continuous never-ending struggle.

Notes

1. Bal, 1977.
2. Austin, 1971, p. 94-107.
3. Lacan, 1977, p. 86.
4. de Boer, 1983, p. 78-104.
5. Cassirer, 1962, p. 23-27.
6. Cassirer, 1969, p. 175.
7. de Saussure, 1969, p. 160.
8. Lacan, 1977, p. 64.
9. Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 258, 265.
10. Wittgenstein, 1969, par. 253.
11. Cassirer, 1964, p. 41.
12. Heidegger, 1972, p. 81.
13. Freud, 1917, p. 143.
14. Freud, 1932, p. 80.

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